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THE NEW PROSECUTORS 
Bennett L. Gershman* 
The power and prestige of the American prosecutor have changed 
dramatically over the past twenty years. Three generalizations appro- 
priately describe this change. First, prosecutors wield vastly more 
power than ever before. Second, prosecutors are more insulated from 
judicial control over their conduct. Third, prosecutors are increasingly 
immune to ethical restraints. Only the last point may provoke some 
controversy; the first two are easily documented, and generally ac- 
cepted by the courts and commentators.' 
Several factors account for this change. The most obvious is the 
transition from a due process-oriented criminal justice model to a 
model that has placed increasing emphasis on crime control and crime 
prevention.Trime has grown more complex and sophisticated since the 
early 1970s, particularly narcotics, racketeering, official corruption, and 
business fraud crimes, requiring a coordinated, powerful, and equally 
sophisticated response. The prosecutor has emerged as the central fig- 
ure with the training and experience to administer this e f f ~ r t . ~  
Examples of this new prosecutor can be seen in the so-called "spe- 
cial prosecutors"' appointed to conduct major investigations such as 
Watergate,6 I ran-C~nt ra ,~  and local corruption probes,' as well as the 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. 
1.  United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 
$ 3551 (1988). See also Bennett Gershman, Abuse of Power in the Prosecutor's Ofice. THE 
WORLD A N D  1. June 1991, a t  476. 
2. See Stephen J. Shulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law 
Enfircement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 18 (1988); Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court's 
Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure: The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 471 (1985). 
3. Ronald Goldstock. The Prosecutor as Problem Solver, Center for Research in Crime and 
Justice. 66 N Y U L REV. 1 1  (1991) (prosecutors "may be the best fitted to assume the leader- 
ship or coordinating role" in crime prevention). Ronald Goldstock, a prosecutor of considerable 
esperience, is presently the Director of the New York State Organized Crime Task Force and a 
Professor at Cornell Law School. 
4. In hforrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld the legitimacy of 
the independent counsel statute (28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599) which authorizes a specially designated 
judicial panel to appoint special prosecutors to investigate high government officials. 
5. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 
( 1  977). 
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expanded use of undercover sting operations led by  prosecutor^.^ To 
support these new prosecutorial initiatives, legislatures have armed 
prosecutors with broad new weapons such as RICO, Drug Enterprise, 
Forfeiture, and Sentencing  guideline^.^ The judiciary has cooperated 
in this new effort too. First, by relaxing constitutional protections em- 
bodied in the exclusionary rule and due process, and by interpreting 
statutory and evidentiary rules broadly in the prosecutor's favor, the 
courts have made it much easier for prosecutors to win  conviction^.^^ 
Second, by their increasing deference to prosecutorial discretion in 
'every form, the courts have stimulated a law enforcement mentality 
that the "end justifies the means." Finally, as resort to the death pen- 
alty increases, the prosecutor has become the most dominant figure on 
the question of who will live and who will die for crimes committed. 
Part I of this article examines in greater detail this vast accretion 
of prosecutorial power, and explains how this transformation has re- 
sulted in a radical skewing of the balance of advantage in the criminal 
justice system in favor of the state. Part I1 then offers several sugges- 
tions on restoring some equilibrium to the process." Equilibrium 
should be restored because the prosecutor, with the power of the state 
behind him or her, should not have this unfair advantage. Reliability 
and fairness will suffer if the equilibrium continues its shift. 
6. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), ntodified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). cert. denied, I I 1 S. Ct. 223 (1991). 
7. Nigrone v. Murtagh, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). a f d ,  330 N.E.2d 45 
(N.Y. 1975). 
8. See infra notes 17-43 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text. Prosecutors will occasionally attribute 
their "successes" in the War on Crime to the use of these new weapons. See Selwyn Raab, U.S. 
Says Mob is Drying Up in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1991, at BI. These comments, attrib- 
uted to federal and state prosecutors, were made after eight defendants were cleared of racketeer- 
ing charges in a major racketeering trial in New York aimed at ending the Mafia's influence in 
the window installation industry. 
10. See infra Part IB. 
I I .  This Article relies heavily on federal doctrine in the Supreme Court and the federal 
courts. These cases represent the national law, and are fairly representative of state criminal pro- 
cedure doctrine generally. However, the increasing reliance by state courts on thcir own state 
constitutions has resulted in significant state departures from federal constitutional law to provide 
much greater protection of individual rights. See Hans A. Linde, First Things Firsr: Redisco~ver- 
ing the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarna- 
rion of Srare Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951 (1982). See also People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915. 920-21 
(N.Y. 1990) (rejecting more limited federal due process standard governing prosecutor's disclo- 
sure obligations in favor of broader standard under state constitution's due process clause). 
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A. Skewing the Balance of Advantage 
In his seminal article on criminal procedure,12 Professor Goldstein 
commented on the "subtle erosion of the accusatorial system."13 More 
than thirty years later, as the prosecutor's investigating, charging, con- 
victing, and sentencing powers have escalated, the "inherent inequal- 
ity" between the prosecutor and the defendant has intensified, making 
the adversary system almost ob~olete.'~ 
I .  Investigative Power 
The prosecutor has always been a major player in crime investiga- 
tion, but today the prosecutor occupies the preeminent role.15 Tradi- 
tional functions have expanded, and new powers have been added. The 
prosecutor develops and coordinates strategies in major undercover in- 
vestigations; uses the grand jury to investigate complex crimes such as 
narcotics trafficking, money laundering, official corruption, white collar 
crime, and organized crime; applies for authorization to obtain eaves- 
dropping warrants; subpoenas records; and obtains the cooperation of 
12. Abraham S. Goldstein. The Srare and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal 
Procedure, 69 YALE L J 1 149 (1960). 
13. Id. at 1199. 
14. As this article demonstrates, the heightened imbalance in the adversary system makes 
the prosecutor less accountable to his peers or to the courts than ever before. Sanctions for mis- 
conduct or overzealous advocacy are either nonexistent or not effective. It may be that the only 
clfective check on prosecutorial power lies in the jury system. To be sure, only a fraction of cases 
go to trial. and most of those cases result in convictions. However, those instances when juries 
have decisively rejected the prosecutor's case-particularly in several recent high-profile cases in- 
volving celebrities, public officials, and major organized crime figures--constitute perhaps the 
most significant check on charging and adversarial abuses by prosecutors. 
15. Goldstock, supra note 3, a t  I I ("Legal rules concerning search and seizure, the right to 
counsel, electronic surveillance and related issues are now so arcane that police must routinely rely 
on lawyers to determine what they may and may not do even in the earliest stages of a complex 
investigation."). 
A somewhat recent phenomenon in criminal procedure is the "cross-designation" of prosecu- 
tors by federal and state agencies to coordinate law enforcement strategies. This practice has been 
criticized as resulting in the manipulation of federal and state prosecutions, making one prosecu- 
tion a mere subterfuge for the other. See United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 
1987) (remanded to consider whether federal prosecution is a subterfuge for state prosecution). 
See also Joel Cohen. "Cross-Designation" of Prosecutors: They Shouldn't Have ir Both Ways. 
NAT'L L.J. Mar. 2. 1987. at 36. The practice is reminiscent of the discarded "silver platter" 
doctrine, where federal police would cooperate with state police by giving them evidence that the 
federal ollicials had illegally seized, but which would be admissible in state courts prior to the 
exclusionary rule's application to state proceedings. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
21 1-13 (1960). 
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witnesses through grants of immunity. Additionally, through sometimes 
controversial investigative methods, the prosecutor has been able to cir- 
cumvent, neutralize, or even eliminate defense counsel as an impedi- 
ment to effective investigation. 
a. Undercover Tactics 
Prosecutors have traditionally used undercover techniques to ac- 
quire evidence of crime. Courts recognize that investigative methods 
involving deception are indispensable to gathering evidence of certain 
types of unlawful activity, particularly with respect to crimes that are 
conducted covertly and do not rely on tangible evidence of past unlaw- 
ful activity or on victims who will complain to law enforcement.16 But, 
over the past twenty years, the scope and variety of undercover activity 
has surged. 
The undercover operations of today involve infiltration and in 
many cases actual participation in the unlawful activity.'? For example, 
law enforcement has established, supplied, and directed a huge array of 
illegal enterprises, including drug manufacturing and distribution 
rings,18 counterfeiting operations,lS bootleg whiskey  operation^,^^ bars 
and restaurants as fronts for criminal activity,2l stolen merchandise 
rings,22 fictitious  corporation^,^^ obscenity prod~ction,~' and many other 
illegal commercial a ~ t i v i t i e s . ~ ~  
The judiciary has approved such conduct, thereby encouraging 
even more aggressive and intrusive tactics such as the elaborate "Ab- 
scam" operation into legislative corrupti0n,2~ and the "Greylord" oper- 
16. United States v. Russell, 41 1 U.S. 423, 432 (1973). 
17. Id. 
18. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 384-86 (5th Cir.), cerr. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 
(1982); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir. 1978). 
19. United States v. Milam, 817 F.2d 11 13, 11 14 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gonza- 
lez, 539 F.2d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027, 1027-28 (7th 
Cir. 1972). rev'd, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), rev'd on remand, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974). 
20. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971). 
21. Chaney v. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 393 N.E.2d 75 (111. App. 1979). aTd,  412 
N.E.2d 497 (111. 1980). 
22. Powers v. Lightner, 752 F.2d 1251, 1252 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Borum, 584 
F.2d 424, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
23. United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir.), cerr. denied, 459 U.S. 835 
(1982). 
24. United States v. Chin, 934 F.2d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 1991). 
25. United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1989). vacaled in purr and aniended. 
923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
26. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461 (D.C. Cir.), cerr. denied, 464 U.S. 908 
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ation into judicial c ~ r r u p t i o n . ~ ~  Indeed, the Abscam investigation of the 
early 1980s was a watershed in undercover investigations. The courts' 
approval legitimized the most intrusive form of undercover tactics that 
had yet been used. 
Under the supervision of local federal prosecutors and the Depart- 
ment of Justice, the FBI created a fictitious Middle Eastern corpora- 
tion. Undercover agents posed as representatives of fantastically 
wealthy Arab sheiks willing to pay huge bribes to public officials for 
their assistance. When Abscam was launched, prosecutors had no spe- 
cific knowledge of corruption against any public official. The sting oper- 
ation was designed simply to "test the faith" of high government offi- 
cials by contriving opportunities for corruption. The operation resulted 
in the convictions of a senior United States senator, six members of 
Congress, a mayor, and an assortment of other public officials, usually 
with videotaped evidence of the bribe transactions in progress providing 
the key for conviction. Every conviction was affirmed on a p ~ e a l , 2 ~  al-
though several judges expressed outrage over the government's tac- 
t i c ~ . ~ ~  Among the criticisms were the targeting of public officials with- 
out any suspicion of prior, ongoing, or future criminal activity on their 
part;30 persistent solicitations with increasingly heavy pressure even af- 
ter initial solicitations were reb~ffed;~' lavish inducements calculated to 
overwhelm even law-abiding citizens;32 and "Gestapom-like secret-po- 
lice tactics seeking to generate new crimes and create new criminals.33 
As prosecutors have become more aggressive, the judiciary has be- 
(1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 606 (2d Cir.), cerr. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 
(1983): United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 860 (2d Cir. 1982). cerr. denied, 461 U.S. 961 
(1983): United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir.), cerr. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982): 
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 610 (3d Cir.), cerr. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). See 
ABSCA~I ETHICS MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION I  LAW ENFORCEMENT (George Caplan ed., 
1983). 
27. United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985). Other undercover operations 
into judicial corruption have included "Corkscrew," which investigated case-fixing in the Munici- 
pal Court in Cleveland. Ohio, and "Bar Tab," which investigated ticket-fixing in the Lake County 
Courts. Lake County. Indiana. 
28. See supra note 26. 
29. Jannorri, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Fullam, J.); Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 
(D.D.C. 1982) (Bryant, J.). 
30. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 371. 
31. Id. at 374. 
32. Jannotti. 501 F. Supp. at 1200. 
33. Jannorti, 673 F.2d 578, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1982) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (Abscam "ema- 
ndtes a fetid odor whose putrescence threatens to spoil basic concepts of fairness and justice that I 
hold dear."). 
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come more permissive. The judiciary will not interfere with these new 
undercover tactics absent governmental conduct that reaches "demon- 
strable levels of outrageou~ness."~~ However, courts have rarely found 
investigative conduct sufficiently outrageous to warrant intervent i~n.~~ 
Thus, Abscam was an inevitable consequence of the courts' laissez-faire 
attitude, and has invited even more extreme undercover tactics. Prose- 
cutors, though, want even more. In United States v. J a c o b ~ o n , ~ ~  prose- 
cutors challenged the Court to extend even further the outer limits of 
permissible undercover operations. 
Keith Jacobson was convicted of receiving in the mail a magazine 
depicting child pornography. Jacobson was a 57-year-old farmer who 
lived alone and supported his elderly parents. He was targeted for an 
undercover sting operation because his name was discovered on a book- 
store's mailing list as having purchased two nudist magazines, the re- 
ceipt of which did not violate any law, and a brochure listing stores 
selling sexually explicit material. The government had no information 
that Jacobson had ever ordered or advertised for any child pornogra- 
phy, had ever purchased child pornography or produced child pornog- 
raphy, or was likely to engage in the receipt or distribution of child 
pornography. Nevertheless, the government launched a two and one- 
half-year operation involving twelve solicitations from five separate gov- 
ernment-created entities in order to entice Jacobson to purchase a mag- 
azine depicting child pornography produced and mailed by the govern- 
ment. He eventually succumbed to the enticement for which he was 
prosecuted and convicted. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the 
34. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
35. United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1991) (undercover agent 
enticed defendant into sexual relationship, and during investigation engaged in acts of prostitution. 
shoplifting, and heroin use, but "sleazy investigative tactics alone" are not necessarily outra- 
geous); United States v. Levasseur, 699 F. Supp. 995, 1008 (D. Mass. 1988), affd, 867 F.2d 36 
(1st Cir. 1989) (government efforts to bribe defendant's children to obtain information was shock- 
ing but not sufficiently outrageous); United States v. Valona, 834 F.2d 1334, 1342-44 (7th Cir. 
1987) (pretargeting of defendants and contingent fee arrangements with informants not outra- 
geous); United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1516 (I lth Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 
(1987) (government sets up lawyer to be informant against client); United States v. Arango. 670 
F. Supp. 1558, 1566-67 (S.D. Fla. 1987). a f d ,  853 F.2d 818 (1 ith Cir. 1988) (government's 
unlawful entry into defendant's apartment and prosecutor's failure to make timely disclosure im- 
proper but not outrageous); see also United States v. Jones. 839 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.), cert. de- 
nied, 486 U.S. 1024 (1988); United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
485 U.S. 908 and 485 U.S. 991 (1988); United States v. Irving, 827 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. ShoKner, 826 F.2d 619 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958 (1987): United 
States v. Degollado, 696 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D. Tex. 1988). 
36. 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. granted, 1 1 1 S. Ct. 1618 (1991). 
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Eighth Circuit reversed his conviction, holding that Jacobson was en- 
trapped as a matter of law.37 Upon rehearing en banc, the court of 
appeals vacated the panel's decision and affirmed the conv ic t i~n .~~  The 
Supreme Court granted c e r t i ~ r a r i , ~ ~  limited to the question of whether 
a defendant has been entrapped as a matter of law when the govern- 
ment, having failed in several attempts to entice him to engage in ille- 
gal activity over a two year period, and in violation of their own guide- 
lines for the conduct of undercover operations,4O finally induces the 
defendant to receive child pornography through the mails. 
The important point of this discussion transcends the particular 
merits of Abscam, Greylord, Jacobson, or any other undercover opera- 
tion. The escalating use of more creative and more intrusive investiga- 
tive techniques is predictably consistent with a prosecutorial mentality 
that seeks to stretch its power to the farthest limits that the courts will 
allow it to reach.41 And this has been very far. As we have seen, the 
courts have become increasingly tolerant of highly offensive law en- 
37. Jacobson. 893 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1990). 
38. Jacobson. 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990). 
39. I I 1  S. Ct. 1618 (1991). 
40. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Guidelines on 
FBI Undercover Operations 16 (Dec. 3 1, 1980), reprinted in Law Enforcentenr Undercover Activi- 
ties: Hearing before Select Contm. to Study Law Enforcement Undercover Activities of Conlpo- 
tter~ts oJthe Dep't of Justice, Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 86. 101 (1982). The Guidelines provide 
that when otTering inducements, specific written approval from the director is necessary unless the 
Undercover Operations Review Committee determines that: 
(a) There is a reasonable indication, based on information developed through informants or 
other means, that the subject is engaged, has engaged, or is likely to engage in illegal 
activity of a similar type; or 
(b) The opportunity for illegal activity has been structured so that there is reason for be- 
lieving that persons drawn to the opportunity, or brought to it, are predisposed to engage in 
the contemplated illegal activity. 
(italicized in test) 
41. This is the point of Justice Jackson's statement in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 
440. 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring), in discussing the tendency of prosecutors to "expand" 
the use of conspiracy doctrine "to the limit of its logic." Prosecutors have shown this same ten- 
dency in using one of the most feared anti-racketeering weapons in their arsenal, the RlCO con- 
>piracy statute, against groups or individuals that hardly could be considered racketeers or en- 
gaged in racketeering activities. See United States v. Pruba. 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 
I l l S. Ct. 305 (1990) (bookkeeper for distributor of pornography); United States v. Alexander, 
888 F.2d 777 ( I  lth Cir. 1989). cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2623 (1990) (local school board official); 
United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989) (owner of 
gasoline stations); United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1986). cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 
1899 (1987) (member of motorcycle gang involved in narcotics trafficking); United States v. 
LeFerour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986) (member of judiciary); 
United States v. Tunnell. 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982) (hotel owner charged with promoting 
prostitution); United States v. Elliot. 71 1 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stock broker). 
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forcement and prosecutors have been adept at capitalizing 
on the judiciary's reluctance to rein them in. Thus, notwithstanding 
claims to individual privacy encompassed by values such as "the right 
to be let alone,"43 we can expect prosecutors increasingly to use more 
imaginative and intrusive undercover tactics both to investigate persons 
suspected of crime-a legitimate goal-and to test the integrity of per- 
sons not suspected of any crime-an illegitimate goal. Historically, 
such tactics have been favored by totalitarian regimes but have been 
regarded as antithetical to individual and political freedom." 
b. Grand Jury Tactics 
A similar phenomenon of enhanced prosecutorial power and re- 
duced judicial supervision is observable in the prosecutor's conduct of 
grand jury investigations. Prosecutors traditionally have assumed a 
highly aggressive posture when using the grand jury as an investigative 
weapon.46 In recent years, however, prosecutors, with the acquiescence 
of the judiciary, have used the grand jury even more aggressively, with 
considerably greater powers. The power to compel the appearance and 
interrogation of witnesses has been reaffirmed and reinforcedt6 the 
power to compel the production of documents has been strengthenedt7 
and the power to dispense with fundamental protections of witnesses 
has been b r ~ a d e n e d . ~ ~  This trend toward virtually unlimited grand jury 
42. See supra note 35. 
43. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), over- 
ruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
44. See Bennett Gershman, ABSCAM: The Judiciary and the Ethics of Entrapment. 91 
YALE L.J. 1565, 1585 (1982). 
45. United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1953) ("Save for torture, it 
would be hard to find a more effective tool of tyranny than the power of unlimited and unchecked 
ex parte examination.") (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954); Robert Camp- 
bell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972) ("Any experienced prosecutor will 
admit that he can indict anybody at anytime for almost anything before any grand jury."). 
46. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 
174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); United States v. Calandra. 414 
U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Brito, 907 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury Proceed- 
ings, 889 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1989). 
47. United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 1 1  1 S. Ct. 722 (1991); In re Grand Jury Subpoc- 
nas, 906 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 89-8, 742 F. Supp. 1 154 (S.D. 
Fla. 1990); United States v. Giovanelli, 747 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
48. Some courts view the grand jury proceeding merely as a preliminary and insubstantial 
stage in the criminal justice process, and the indictment simply a determination that the accused 
should be formally tried. See Bracy v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.) 
(application for stay). 
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power is underscored by an increasing reluctance of courts to check 
prosecutorial excesses, as noted above. Thus, the decline of supervisory 
the requirement that a defendant must await conviction and 
establish prejudice before he can raise a claim of prosecutorial miscon- 
and the recent application of the harmless error rule to grand 
jury  proceeding^,^^ make it unlikely that valid claims of prosecutorial 
abuse of the grand jury will be s u ~ t a i n e d . ~ ~  This is a perversion of the 
historic function of the grand jury as a buffer between the citizen and 
the state. 
c. Attack on Lawyers 
Added to these new developments is an even more ominous threat 
to the adversary system: the unprecedented use by prosecutors of the 
grand jury and other means to attack and cripple the criminal defense 
bar.63 One of the most alarming events during the last decade has been 
the prosecutor's attempt to compel criminal defense attorneys to give 
testimony and produce documents that might incriminate their cli- 
e n t ~ . ~ '  The testimony is usually sought in connection with fees, a sub- 
ject that most courts have held is not covered by the attorney-client 
p r i ~ i l e g e . ~ ~  Recent statistics show that prosecutors in the United States 
issue subpoenas to defense attorneys at  the rate of 645 per year.66 Fur- 
49. Anne B. Poulin. Supervision of the Grand Jury: Who Watches the Guardian?, 68 
WASH U L Q  885, 890 (1990). 
50. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988). 
51. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 71-72 (1986). See also Midland Asphalt Corp. 
v. United States. 489 U.S. 794, 798-802 (1989) (denial of pretrial motion to dismiss indictment 
not subject to interlocutory appeal). 
52. For a recent case, see United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1990) (on 
certiorari court to decide whether prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the 
grand jury). 
53. David Rudovsky, The Right to Counsel Under Attack. 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1965 (1988). 
54. Max D. Stern & David Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney-Subpoena Prob- 
lrni and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1786 (1988). See In re Grand Jury 
Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 
1990); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1986). See also United States v. 
hlarshnnk, 777 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (indictment dismissed on ground that prosecutor 
encouraged criminal defense attorney to set up his client to engage in criminal activity). But see 
United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1987) (judicial approval needed before prosecu- 
tors can subpoena attorney). 
55. Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1429 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Pro- 
ceedings. 517 F.2d 666, 671 (5th Cir. 1975). 
56. Behind Closed Doors, THE CHAMPION I8 (Richard Bing ed., May 1990). Rule 3.8 of 
the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1990) has been amended to place limits on 
the prosecutor's power to subpoena lawyers. 
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ther, most courts do not require any special evidentiary showing before 
a subpoena can be enforced against a lawyer.67 Attorneys have been 
jailed for refusing to cooperate with the p r o s e c u t ~ r . ~ ~  As with grand 
jury subpoenas, prosecutors also have begun to use the statutory sum- 
moning power of the Internal Revenue Service to force criminal de- 
fense attorneys to disclose the identities of clients or third parties who 
pay fees in excess of $10,000 cash. In United States v. Goldberger & 
D ~ b i n , ~ @  the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld 
the enforcement of such an IRS summons against a law firm, rejecting 
claims that enforcement violated the attorneys' constitutional rights or 
ethical obligations toward their clients. 
The new aggressive investigative tactics against attorneys are not 
limited to grand jury subpoenas or IRS summonses. There has been a 
rising incidence of law office searches,sO disqualification of attorneys 
from representing clients,61 forfeiture of attorneys' fees under broad 
57. In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated August 21. 1985. 793 F.2d 69, 
74 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 791 F.2d 663, 672 (8th Cir. 1986). Guidelines 
issued by the Justice Department and the United States Attorneys Office for the Southern District 
of New York require that information be first sought from alternative sources, and that negotia- 
tions with attorneys are required before subpoenas can be issued. 
58. Julie DelCour, Attorneys Jailed for Keeping Silent, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 18, 1989, at 3: 
Lawyer is Freed Ajier Being Jailed Six Months for Refusing to Testify, N.Y. TIMES, June I I, 
1991, a t  A17. 
59. 935 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1991). 
60. Rudovsky, supra note 53, at 1967. For a recent and extremely heavy-handed law office 
search, see Geilim v. Los Angeles County Superior Court. 234 Cal. App. 3d 166 (1991) (huge 
numbers of client files seized from attorney under investigation for client fraud; judge to review 
every document seized). 
61. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988); United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 
742. 747 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. DiTommasso, 817 F.2d 201. 220 (2d Cir. 1987): United 
States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). See Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass 
Darkly:" How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM L 
REV. 1201 (1989); Nancy J. Moore, Disqualification of an Attorney Representing Multiple Wit- 
nesses Before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics and the Stonewall Defense, 27 UCLA L REV I 
(1980). 
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forfeiture statutes,e2 and the prosecution of attorneys under obstruction 
of justice statutes for giving legal advice to clients.63 
Today's law enforcement climate recalls the famous line from 
Shakespeare's play Henry V-"The first thing we do, let's kill all the 
lawyers."64 This new strategy to "kill attorneys" appears to be the re- 
sult of a new prosecutorial ethos that views the criminal defense bar as 
no more than an obstruction to legitimate government investigations. 
Prosecutors for quite some time have sought to circumvent the attor- 
ney-client relationship by contacting a represented individual directly 
and often s~rrepti t iously.~~ However, in an unprecedented statement, 
the Attorney General of the United States recently instructed federal 
prosecutors that in the course of investigations that necessitate contact 
with persons who are represented by counsel, federal prosecutors are 
exempt from ethical rules that prohibit lawyers from communicating 
with clients who are represented by counsel.66 The statement suggested 
that it was a response to efforts by some criminal defense lawyers who 
sought to enforce the disciplinary rule against p rosec~ to r s .~~  
The consequences of this new prosecutorial strategy may be the 
62. 21 U.S.C. 5 853 (1985). The Supreme Court upheld the validity of criminal forfeiture 
over claims that it impermissibly burdened the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to retain coun- 
sel of his choice. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 614 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, 
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989). In seeking forfeiture, federal prosecutors 
arc asking courts to impose lower burdens of proof in forfeiture proceedings, and courts are acqui- 
escing. See United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512, 1542 (7th Cir. 1990) (forfeiture statute 
requires standard of preponderance of evidence); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 876 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (legislative history of forfeiture statute reflects legislative intent to change burden of 
proof from beyond reasonable doubt to preponderance standard). But see United States v. Elger- 
sma, 929 F.2d 1538, 1549 (I Ith Cir. 1991) (standard of proof in criminal forfeiture proceedings is 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
63. United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987); 
United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975). See Joel Cohen & Norman Bloch, Can 
La~cyers be Prosecuted for the Advice They Give?, N.Y.L.J., July 23, 1991, at  1, 5; Bruce A. 
Green. Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal 
Lan: 69 N.C L REV. 687, 699-704 (1991). 
64. WILLIA~I  SHAKESPEARE. KING HENRY V, act 2, sc. 2. 
65. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 
(1977): O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 
(1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 
(1964). 
66. Memorandum to All Justice Department Litigators from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney 
General. June 8. 1989. See Jerry E. Norton, Ethics and the Attorney General, 74 JUDICATURE 
203. 204-07 (1991). 
67. The Memorandum states that "the defense bar has continued to press its position that 
DR 7-104 does in fact limit the universe of appropriate federal investigative techniques." Norton, 
supra note 66. at 204. 
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destruction of the adversary system.68 Defense attorneys are increas- 
ingly placed on the defensive, giving prosecutors greater leverage over 
their clients.60 The trust and confidence that clients and their attorneys 
need in order to function together is being eroded. Moreover, many 
defense lawyers will be driven out of defense work by the pressures, 
harassment, and potential loss of income from return of fees.70 Finally, 
and most ominously, prosecutors have been given the power to select or 
reject their own adversaries, and thereby refashion, and to some extent 
even control, the course of private criminal defense representation, 
foreshadowing the demise of the system of private criminal defense 
work." It is wonderfully ironic that while the Supreme Court continues 
to demand the highest ethical standards from criminal defense law- 
y e r ~ , ~ ~  the Court continues, in case after case to countenance instances 
68. A most unsettling recent phenomenon has been prosecutorial efforts to seek sanctions 
against attorneys who bring pre-trial motions. Such sanctions were recently upheld against a pub- 
lic defender for filing a pre-trial motion to strike the state's request for the death penalty. Young 
v. Ninth Judicial District Ct., 818 P.2d 844 (Nev. 1991). 
69. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 650 (1980) ("Perhaps 
most troubling is the fact that forfeiture statutes place the Government in the position to exercise 
an intolerable degree of power over any private attorney who takes on the task of representing a 
defendant in a forfeiture case.") (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
70. Id. at 650. "Government will be ever tempted to use the forfeiture weapon against a 
defense attorney who is particularly talented or aggressive on the client's behalf-the attorney 
who is better than what, in the Government's view, the defendant deserves." (Blackmun, J.. 
dissenting). 
71. Id. at  651. "The long-term effects of the fee-forfeiture practice will be to decimate the 
private criminal-defense bar." (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
72. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (not ethical violation or deprivation of Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel for lawyer to inform on client who intends to 
commit perjury); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (permissible to impose evidence sanctions 
against defendant for attorney's violation of discovery order); Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada. 1 1  1 
S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (State Bar has authority to impose disciplinary sanctions against criminal 
defense attorney who makes extrajudicial statements about pending case). The Gentile case is 
noteworthy in showing that bar associations are quite willing to impose disciplinary sanctions 
against defense lawyers for extrajudicial statements, but rarely invoke such sanctions against pros- 
ecutors for similar conduct, such as holding press conferences to announce indictments. See Ger- 
ald Stern, Trial by Lawyer Press Conference: Why is Such a Fanfare Permitted?, NAT'L L.J. 
May 6, 1985, at 17-20. 
It is also ironic that while the Supreme Court demands increasingly higher ethical standards 
for defense lawyers, the Court also has imposed correspondingly lower standards for defense coun- 
sel's competence and loyalty. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (reasonable 
competence required); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (lawyer need not argue points that 
defendant wishes to be argued); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (counsel need not 
argue seek to appeal if he believes client's case has no merit). 
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of prosecutorial misconduct that pose a far more pernicious threat to 
the future of adversarial justice and individual rights.73 
2. Charging Power 
Mostly as a result of his crime-charging power, the prosecutor has 
always been regarded as one of the most powerful officials in govern- 
ment.74 Prosecutors historically have enjoyed almost unfettered discre- 
73. Pcrhaps taking a cue from the Supreme Court's prosecutor misconduct jurisprudence, 
courts sccm increasingly skeptical not merely over claims of misconduct but of the term itself. In 
McGricr v. Unitcd States. 597 A.2d 36 (D.C. 1991). in a portion of the opinion entitled "A Word 
on Nomenclature," the court agreed that the term "prosecutorial misconduct" in most cases is 
"unwarranted" and "overused." "Some less sinister name should be given to the rhetorical ex- 
cesses of attorneys who say what they should not say when engaged in forensic combat." Id. at 40- 
41. However, this court, and commentators, seem to forget that prosecutors have higher ethical 
obligations than lawyers generally. See infra notes 300-09 and accompanying text. For example. 
Judgc Thomas M. Reavley of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit states that "[tlhe great- 
est challenge is the case of the guilty criminal." Thomas M. Reavley. The Moral Responsibility 
o/La~t:rers. 19 TES TECH L. REV 1393. 1402 (1988). Nowhere in his article does Judge Reavley 
so much as mention the moral responsibility of prosecutors, or even hint that an equally "great 
challenge" to prosecutors (they are lawyers) might be "the case of the innocent defendant," or 
"the case of the invidiously selected defendant," or "the case of the guilty criminal who is entitled 
to a fair trial." 
74. The Supreme Court made this point recently, stating: "Between the private life of the 
citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That state official has 
the power to employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given individual." Young 
v. Unitcd Statcs ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987). 
As any informed observer of the criminal justice system knows, the prosecutor "runs the 
show." The prosecutor decides whether or not to bring criminal charges; who to charge; what 
charges to bring; whether a defendant will stand trial, plead guilty, or enter a correctional pro- 
gram in lieu of criminal charges; and whether to confer immunity from prosecution. The prosecu- 
tor elTcctively has the power to invoke or deny punishment, and in those jurisdictions that author- 
ize capital punishment, the power literally over life and death. Increasing scholarly attention is 
being focused on the prosecutor's role in criminal justice administration. See, e.g., James Voren- 
berg, Decent Restraint ofProsecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1555 (1981); FRANK W. 
~ ~ I L I . E R .  PROSECUTION-THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A C R I ~ I E  (1970); KENNETH 
C DAVIS. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecu- 
roc A Conceptual Franlework. 15 Ahf. J. CRILI. L. 197 (1988); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the 
Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 
( 199 1 ); Francis A. Allen. A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal 
Justice in the Courts of Review, 70 IOWA L. REV. 31 1, 333-36 (1985); H. Richard Uviller, The 
Virtlto~t.~ Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 7 1 MICH. L. REV. 
1145 (1973); Randolph V. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550 
(1987): Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 
532 (1970); John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 
(1965): Charles D. Breitel. Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427 
(1960). 
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tion in bringing charges.76 Doctrines such as conspiracy, for example, 
have given prosecutors tremendous power to join parties and offenses in 
one indi~tment.?~ The presumption that prosecutors act in good faith 
has made the charging power virtually immune from judicial review.'? 
However, we have witnessed recently an even larger accretion of the 
prosecutor's charging power through legislative enactments, bold 
prosecutorial initiatives, and judicial acquie~cence.~~ 
a. New Crimes 
To supplement the prosecutor's already considerable arsenal, Con- 
gress over the past twenty years has passed legislation providing prose- 
cutors with more potent laws than ever before: Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act;79 Continuing Criminal Enterprises 
Criminal Forfeitures Act;a1 Armed Career Criminal 
Money Laundering Bail Reform Comprehensive Thrift 
and Bank Fraud Victims of Child Abuse Moreover, the 
75. See supra note 74. See also McKIeskey v. Kemp. 48 1 U.S. 279, 3 12 (1 987) ("A prose- 
cutor can decline to charge, offer a plea bargain, or decline to seek a death sentence in any 
particular case."). 
76. The oft-quoted passage by Judge Learned Hand referred to the conspiracy doctrine as 
"that darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery." Harrison v. United States. 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d 
Cir. 1925). 
77. See. e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 
598 (1985); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979). 
The courts occasionally impose some limits on excessive charging practices. See. e.g., United 
States v. McNally, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. $ 1341, limited to 
money or property rights and does not extend to intangible right of citizen to good government): 
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 60 
U.S.L.W. 2903 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1992) (No. 91-1085) (prosecution for insider trading under Securi- 
ties and Exchange Act reversed in absence of fiduciary duty); United States v. Coates. 949 F.2d 
104 (4th Cir. 1991) (government manufactured federal interstate nexus through telephone call, 
thereby transforming state murder prosecution into federal offense); United States v. Ivic. 700 
F.2d 51, 59-61 (2d Cir. 1983) (RICO prosecution dismissed where "enterprise" not shown to have 
financial purpose); United States v. Archer, 486.F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973) (federal prosecution 
under Travel Act failed to show that interstate facilities were used to promote corruption). 
78. A prosecutor is absolutely immune from civil liability for charging excesses. lmbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). 
79. I8 U.S.C. 1961-68 (1988 and Supp. 1 1989). See United States v. Turkette, 452 
U.S. 576 (1981); Russel10 v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983). 
80. 21 U.S.C. 848 (1988). 
81. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988). 
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1202 (1988): see also I8 U.S.C. § 921 (1988). 
83. 18 U.S.C. 1956, 1957 (1988). 
84. 18 U.S.C. $8 1341-43 (1988 and Supp. 1 1989). See United States v. Salerno. 481 U.S. 
739 (1 987) (upholding pretrial detention pro\.isions as not violative of due process). 
85. Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C.A. $ 1001 (Supp. 1991). 
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recent trend toward mandatory minimum sentencings7 has given prose- 
cutors greater leverage than ever to compel plea bargaining, force coop- 
eration, and effectively determine the length of  sentence^.^^ 
Faced with increasing public pressure to win the "War on Crime," 
lawmakers continue to add even more crimes. For example, the Senate 
and House recently passed a new crime bill that would allow federal 
capital punishment for drug kingpins and permit imposition of the 
death penalty for some fifty federal offenses.s9 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
publicly criticized the bill, arguing that it would inundate federal pros- 
ecutors with an unmanageable caseload of offenses that traditionally 
have been the province of state  prosecutor^.^^ Recent efforts for even 
stronger prosecutorial initiatives have resulted in some astonishing pro- 
posals, a striking example being a provision in President Bush's Anti- 
Crime Bill that would authorize prosecutors to convene special tribu- 
nals to try foreigners accused of acts of t e r r o r i ~ m . ~ ~  In proceedings 
before those tribunals, the defendants would not be allowed to rebut or 
even see the evidence against them. Expanding the Criminal Code in 
this way produces more convictions and is politically expedient, but the 
administrative and individual liberty costs are great. This is not a salu- 
tary development, especially in an era of tremendous overcrowding in 
the nation's prisons. 
b. Uncontrolled Discretion 
Commentators have described the prosecutor's discretion as poten- 
tially "lawless,"e2 " tyranni~al ,"~~ and "most dangerou~."~~ The prose- 
cutor carries out his charging function independent from the judiciary. 
86. Victims of Child Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 5 2251: 42 U.S.C.A. $5 13001 (1991). 
87. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361. 364 (1989) (emphasizing the power of Con- 
gress to impose mandatory sentences); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-605 (1978) (individual- 
ized sentencing not constitutionally required); Ehrsam v. Rubenstein, 917 F.2d 764, 766-67 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (upholding constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act). 
88. See infra notes 171-92 and accompanying text. 
89. CliITord Krauss, House Approves Measure Adding Capital Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
17. 1991. at A21. 
90. Gwcn Ifill. Rehnquist Opposes Bill that Seeks Shift in Gun Trials in U.S. Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES. Sept. 21. 1991. at AS. 
91. David Johnston. Crinre Bill Would Establish Alien Deportation Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, 
June I .  1991. at A6. 
92. HERBERT L PACKER. THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 290 (1968). 
93. Henderson v. United States, 349 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J., 
discenting). 
94. Robert H. Jackson. The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J .  CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3. 5 
( 1940). 
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A prosecutor cannot be compelled to bring or to terminate 
them.06 A private citizen has no standing to bring a criminal complaint 
if the prosecutor decides not to prosecute.07 And the judiciary has 
shown a remarkable passivity when asked to review the prosecutor's 
charging  decision^.^^ Indeed, some courts have deferred absolutely to 
the prosecutor's discretion, even though that decision has been shown to 
be demonstrably unfair.Oe Thus, overcharging crimes,loO discriminating 
against defendants for prosecution,101 improper joinder of charges or 
parties,lo2 vindictivene~s,'~~ coercive dismissals,104 plea bargaining 
abuses,lo6 and immunity violations,106 continue to occur regularly, with- 
out meaningful judicial review or correction.lo7 
Uncontrolled discretion in the hands of a powerful government of- 
ficial has the potential for abuse. In the hands of prosecutors, this po- 
95. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); 
Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir. 1973). 
96. United States v. Lovasco. 431 U.S. 783, 784-788 (1977). 
97. Tonkin v. Michael, 349 F. Supp. 78 (D.V.I. 1972). 
98. See ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN. THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
Aun THE GUILTY PLEA 5 (1981) (prosecutor considered "so integral and expert a part of the 
executive branch that he may not be interfered with by the judiciary"). 
99. United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1989) (refusal to recommend leniency 
based on defendant's cooperation not reviewable), cert. denied, 11 1 S. Ct. 433 (1990); United 
States v. Nathan. 816 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1987) (refusal to grant defendant pretrial diversion not 
reviewable). 
100. Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986). cert. denied, 492 U.S. 922 (1989) (prosecu- 
tor's violation of Double Jeopardy Clause by charging defendant with jeopardy-barred crime of 
aggravated murder not prejudicial in view of trial court's reduction of conviction to lesser included 
offense which was not jeopardy-barred); United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296 (9th 
Cir. 1992 50 Cr. L. 1457) (court will not supervise the exercise of prosecutorial discretion even if 
that discretion is so arbitrary and capricious as to violate due process). 
101. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (selective prosecution of draft 
protesters). 
102. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986) (misjoinder of charges upheld as not 
prejudicial). 
103. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (retaliation against defendant by in- 
creasing charges after refusal to accept plea offer); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 
(1982) (same). 
104. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (threat to prosecute unless defend- 
ant executes an agreement not to sue public officials in connection with arrest not coercive). 
105. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984) (withdrawal of plea offer after acceptance but 
before execution of plea not violative of due process); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970) (threat of death penalty to force defendant to plead guilty to lesser murder charge not 
coercive). 
106. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (prosecution on charges for which 
immunity conferred not improper); Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (prosecutor's unilat- 
eral decision that defendant breached plea agreement so as to allow prosecution upheld). 
107. See generally BENNETT GERSHMAN. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1985). 
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tential is now a reality. Courts are unwilling to systematically rein in 
the prosecutors, resulting in a decline in the fairness of, and a loss of 
public confidence in, the system. 
An horrendous example of the prosecutor's exercise of virtually 
uncontrolled charging discretion is seen in capital cases. Prosecutors 
historically have sought the death penalty disproportionately against 
black defendants as opposed to white defendants.lo8 In McCleskey v. 
Kemp,loB the Supreme Court was presented with a statistical study of 
the capital punishment process in Georgia that showed that prosecutors 
sought the death penalty in seventy percent of the cases involving black 
defendants and white victims, and in only nineteen percent of the cases 
involving white defendants and black victims."O The study also showed 
that a defendant's odds of receiving a death sentence were 4.3 times 
greater if his victim was white than if the victim was black."l Al- 
though expressly assuming the validity of the study,l12 the Supreme 
Court found that the statistics did not prove that the death penalty was 
administered in a racially discriminatory manner.l13 Other studies also 
have shown that killers of white persons are prosecuted more vigorously 
than killers of black persons,lM and that black defendants charged with 
raping white women were more likely to be executed than were white 
defendants charged with raping black women,n6 yet courts do not im- 
pose any restraints on these manifestly invidious prosecutorial charging 
decisions. 
1011. See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (of 455 men 
executed for rape since 1930, 405 [89 percent] of them were black; in vast majority of cases 
complainants were white) (Bazelon, J., concurring); William Tabak & Mark Lane, The Execu- 
tion of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Lou. L.A. L. 
REV 59.89-93 (1989) (describing various studies documenting discriminatory application of capi- 
tal punishment). 
109. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
110. Id. at  287 (the "Baldus Study"). See David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles 
Pulaski. Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty, 15 STET- 
50% L REV I33 (1986); David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles Pulaski, Comparative 
Revinc. of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J .  CRIM. L. & 
C R ~ ~ ~ I N O L O G Y  661 (1983). 
l l I .  hfcCleskey, 48 1 U.S. a t  287. 
1 12. Id. at 291 n.7. 
1 13. Commentators have compared the McKleskey case to the infamous "Dred Scott" deci- 
hion. Hugo Adam Bedau, Someday McKIeskey Will  be Death Penalty's Dred Scott, L.A. TIMES, 
hlay 1 ,  1987, § 2 at 5; Randall L. Kennedy, McKleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and 
the Suprenre Court. 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1389 (1988). 
114. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 108. a t  90-92. 
I IS. See supra note 108. 
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c. Megatrials 
Equally devastating as the prosecutor's unchecked power over who 
and what to charge is the prosecutor's power over how to charge. A 
graphic illustration is the new phenomenon known as the "mega- 
trial."l16 The megatrial is a gargantuan criminal trial that can take up 
to two years to try, and involves numerous defendants, a myriad of 
varying charges and disparate criminal acts, a vast number of witnesses 
and exhibits, and an accompanying large number of defense counsel. 
Prosecutors deliberately seek to bring these "aberrations"l17 because 
the benefits are considerable. The rationale usually advanced is "effi- 
ciency" and "fairnes~"~~~-judicial resources are conserved and not du- 
plicated; the burden on witnesses to repeat testimony is alleviated; the 
probability of inconsistent and erratic verdicts is reduced. 
There are additional reasons why prosecutors want to charge de- 
fendants together in large group trials. Usually in large conspiracy 
cases, some defendants are directly involved, while others are only pe- 
ripherally involved. The prosecutor's proof often is disproportionately 
addressed to defendants in different degrees. In a joint trial, the evi- 
dence comes in against all defendants together, notwithstanding their 
differing degrees of inv~lvernent."~ Prosecutors know that in a long and 
complex case, it is virtually impossible for jurors to compartmentalize 
proof against individual defendants. Some prosecutors pin their hopes 
on convicting minor participants who are charged in a small proportion 
of the counts on the slowly accumulating evidence against the major 
players, and the likelihood of "spillover taint."lZ0 Moreover, in complex 
trials, such as RICO conspiracies, evidence will be admissible against 
some defendants but not against others. As Federal District Judge Jack 
Weinstein observed, "[Tlhere are conspiracies within conspiracies, and 
116. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 
3498 (U.S. 1992) (13-month RICO conspiracy trial); United States v. Casamento. 887 F.2d 1141 
(2d Cir. 1989). cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990) (17-month RICO conspiracy trial involving 35 
charged defendants and 21 defendants tried together); United States v. Shea, 750 F. Supp. 46 (D. 
Mass. 1990) (cocaine trafficking indictment charging twenty-three defendants in 57 counts and 99 
overt acts). 
1 17. Polizzi v. United States, 926 F.2d 131 1, 1313 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing RICO con- 
spiracy trial of 22 defendants, lasting seventeen months, consuming 265 trial days, producing over 
40.000 pages of transcript, and involving the introduction of thousands of exhibits and the testi- 
mony of more than 275 witnesses). 
118. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (Scalia, J.). 
119. United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736. 749-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
120. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d at  799. 
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conspiracies to conceal other conspiracies, conspiracies which are dis- 
crete and finite, and those which are amorphous and indefinite, involv- 
ing conspirators joining and leaving the conspiracy at  various times."121 
Asking jurors to make such factual distinctions over the course of many 
months "would be virtually impossible without the aid of a com- 
p ~ t e r . " ' ~ ~  Here again, although courts have criticized the prosecutorial 
tactic of bringing rnegatrial~, '~~ they usually defer to the prosecutor's 
discretion.'*' This is a dangerous abdication of the judicial duty. 
3. Convicting Power 
a. Greater Access to Evidence 
The prosecutor's task of convicting defendants has been made eas- 
ier by several factors. As noted above, broader investigative powers, 
more aggressive grand jury probes, and more elaborate undercover op- 
erations produce more evidence relevant to guilt. Judicial loosening of 
many of the restrictions on the exclusionary rule also produces more 
evidence.126 
b. Strategic Superiority 
Moreover, greater prosecutorial flexibility to join parties and 
crimes pursuant to broad new substantive statutes such as RICO and 
Continuing Criminal Enterprise offenses also makes convictions more 
likely. The "megatrial" phenomenon is just one dramatic application of 
this new power. The judiciary's increased tolerance of prosecutorial ex- 
cesses, notably the expanded use of harmless error review,'26 and the 
decline of supervisory power,12' makes it easier to preserve convictions, 
121. United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. at 751. 
122. Id. at 752. 
123. Salerno. 937 F.2d at 799. Bringing megatrials can be counterproductive. In one of the 
longest criminal trials in the United States, twenty defendants accused of making up the 
Luccheses crime family were acquitted after a twenty-one month trial in New Jersey. Interviews 
with the jury after the verdict suggest that the length and complexity of the case were partly 
responsible for the hasty verdict. Jesus Rangel, AN 20 Acquitted in Jersey Mob Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 27. 1988. a t  I .  
124. Bur see United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736 Cjudge breaks up sixteen-defendant 
RICO conspiracy case into seven separate trials); United States v. Shea, 750 F. Supp. a t  50-51 
(judge grants severance in huge narcotics conspiracy trial involving twenty-three defendants). 
125. See. e.g.. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); New York v. Quarles. 467 U.S. 
649 (1984). 
126. See irtfra notes 205-37 and accompanying text. 
127. See itljja notes 238-62 and accompanying text. 
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but also has a more sinister consequence in encouraging prosecutors to 
engage in misconduct to win convictions.128 Finally, the judiciary's fail- 
ure to set meaningful standards for competent defense advocacy results 
in more and more instances of defense ineffectiveness, which makes it 
much easier for prosecutors to win.lZ0 This failure has its greatest im- 
pact in capital cases, where the courts have condoned grossly ineffective 
representation resulting in defendants being convicted and executed.laO 
c. More Favorable Rules of Evidence 
In addition to gaining access to more evidence, and enjoying new 
strategic superiority, today's prosecutor also is the beneficiary of more 
favorable rules of evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence, for exam- 
ple, which are used in federal courts and most state courts, expand the 
admissibility of evidence that previously might have been excluded.lal 
Since the prosecutor bears the exclusive burden of producing evidence 
in a criminal trial, he is naturally the principal beneficiary of these 
broadened standards of admissibility. For the same reason, while 
greater judicial discretion in admitting evidence, also provided in the 
128. See infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text. 
129. See infra notes 264-310 and accompanying text. 
130. McKleskey v. Zant, 11 1 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (omission of claim from first habeas peti- 
tion constituted abuse of writ; defendant executed); Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1096 (I lth 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1088 (1986) (lawyer fails to present any evidence that defend- 
ant had no previous record and was honorably discharged from army; defendant executed), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1088 (1986). See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (notice of 
appeal of capital conviction not timely filed and therefore habeas petition properly dismissed); 
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (lawyer fails to present any mitigating evidence at sentenc- 
ing stage even though seventeen-year-old of sub-normal intelligence a t  time of killing); Jones v. 
Thigpen, 555 F. Supp. 870, 878-89 (S.D. Miss. 1983) (lawyer fails to present any evidence that 
defendant mentally retarded), modified, 741 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1984). vacated on other grounds, 
475 U.S. 1003 (1986). 
13 1. David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L REV. 937, 
956 (1990) (federal rules demonstrate "decided bias toward admissibility rather than exclusion 
and the abrogation of many per se exclusionary rules"). To date, 34 states have adopted the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., State Adoption of the Federal Rules: 
The Pros and Cons, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 293 (1990). The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fed- 
eral Rules broadly in favor of admissibility. See United States v. Bourjailly, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) 
(a court in determining admissibility of evidence under Federal Rule 104 may consider evidence 
that would not be admissible; rejects "bootstrapping rule" of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 
60 (1942)); United States v. Owens. 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (neither Confrontation Clause nor Fed- 
eral Rule 802 bars admission of prior out-of-court statement of witness who is unable because of 
memory loss to explain basis for identification); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) 
(Confrontation Clause does not require showing of unavailability as condition to admission of out- 
of-court statement of non-testifying co-conspirator). 
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Federal Rules of E ~ i d e n c e , ' ~ ~  is theoretically of equal benefit to both 
the prosecution and the defense, in practice it is much more likely to 
assist the prosecutor. Several examples will illustrate this development. 
d. Character Proof 
Prosecutors are forbidden to seek a conviction by proving that a 
defendant has a bad character.133 The prejudicial impact of such evi- 
dence on a jury can be de~astat ing. '~~ Although the Federal Rules of 
Evidence continue to prohibit character proof generally,136 several ex- 
ceptions actually authorize the admission of character proof,136 and the 
courts have interpreted these exceptions expansively. For instance, Rule 
404(b) of the Federal Rules allows the prosecutor to introduce proof 
that the accused committed other similar crimes for the purpose of 
proving an essential element of the crime charged. This rule has been 
interpreted to benefit the prosecutor. In Huddleston v. United 
States,13' the Supreme Court adopted an evidentiary standard that 
would carry the greatest potential for admitting such proof. 
The defendant was charged with criminal possession of stolen 
property. Proof that the defendant on two previous occasions had pos- 
sessed stolen property was sought to be admitted to prove guilty knowl- 
edge. Although some federal courts had required the prosecutor to 
prove the defendant's commission of these other crimes by either "clear 
and convincing evidence,"138 or by a "preponderance of evidence,"13g 
the Supreme Court ruled that neither standard was appropriate be- 
cause it imposed too heavy a burden on the prosecutor. The proof 
132. Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 
IOWA L REV 413, 466 (1989) ("Federal Rules intended to give trial judges considerable leeway 
in making evidentiary decisions."). 
133. FED R. EVID 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion."). 
134. 1 JOHN H WIGMORE. EVIDENCE 57 (3d ed. 1940) ("The deep tendency of human 
nature to punish, not because our victim is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and may 
as well be condemned now that he is caught, is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any 
jury. in or out of Court."). Empirical studies have shown that when a defendant's criminal record 
is known and the prosecution's case has weaknesses, the defendant's chances of acquittal are 38 
pkrcent. compared to 65 percent otherwise. HERBERT KALVEN & HOWARD ZEISEL. THE AMERI- 
CAN JURY 160 (1966). 
135. FED R EVID 404(a). 
136. F ~ D  R EVID. 404(b), 608. 609. 
137. 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
138. United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Weber, 
818 F.2d 14, 14 (8th Cir. 1987). 
139. United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1090 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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should be allowed, the Court concluded, "if there is sufficient evidence 
to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the simi- 
lar act."140 Similarly, in Dowling v. United States,141 the Supreme 
Court allowed proof of other purported criminal conduct-a previous 
armed robbery of which the defendant was acquitted-to prove the 
commission of a robbery for which the defendant was being tried. This 
new standard will result in Rule 404(a) becoming virtually meaning- 
less, thereby allowing inadmissible character proof to smear a defend- 
ant's character in front of the 
e. Sexual Abuse Cases 
New rules of evidence also have been enacted to make accessible 
to the prosecutor considerably more proof in sexual abuse cases, and to 
limit the ability of defendants to discredit complaining sex abuse vic- 
tims. For example, the hearsay rule has been modified in many juris- 
dictions to allow an exception for the introduction of hearsay state- 
ments of child victims in sexual abuse cases.143 By the same token, so- 
called "rape-shield statutes" have been enacted into the Federal 
and the evidence codes in virtually every state,146 to limit the 
ability of defense counsel to cross-examine victims in sexual abuse 
cases about their past sexual behavior. Statutes also have been enacted 
protecting such crime victims from having to confront the defendant 
physically during the Finally, legislation has been passed pro- 
140. Huddlesron, 485 U.S. a t  685. 
141. 1 1 0 s .  Ct. 668 (1990). 
142. See Estelle v. Maquire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991) (crimes with which defendant was not 
even connected were admitted against the defendant, who was subsequently convicted). 
143. KAN. STAT. ANN. 3 60-460(dd) (1991); ILL. REV. STAT. 3 115-10 (1990); COLO REV 
STAT. 3 13-25-129 (1987). 
144. FED. R. EVID. 412. 
145. See. e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW .§ 60.42 (McKinney 1981). See also J. Alexander 
Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and rhe Sixrh Amendment, 128 U .  
PA. L REV. 544 (1980). 
146. Craig v. Maryland, I 10 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). The Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990 
authorizes the use of closed circuit television of the testimony of a child witness if one of four 
broadly worded factors is found: ( I )  the child is "unable to testify because of fear;" (2) there is 
"substantial likelihood that the child would suffer emotional trauma from testifying:" (3) the child' 
suffers a "mental or other infirmity;" (4) conduct by defendant or defense counsel that "causes 
the child to be unable to continue testifying." If the television system or depositions are invoked. 
counsel for both sides may be present in the room with the child, but the defendant can be ex- 
cluded, provided a closed circuit television system is set up to relay the defendant's image into the 
room where the child is testifying or being deposed, and means are available to permit the defend- 
ant to privately and contemporaneously communicate with counsel. 
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tecting crime victims in non-sex offense cases from unduly aggressive or 
harassing cross-examination concerning the victim's sexual conduct.147 
f. Espert Witnesses 
The ability of experts to give opinions has been expanded thus 
making it easier for the prosecutor to get key information admitted. 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules has been interpreted to allow experts 
much wider latitude in giving conclusions about the ultimate issues in a 
case.148 This trend is particularly noticeable in narcotics cases.14s For 
example, experts for the prosecution have been allowed to give opinions 
that the defendant's conduct indicated that he was a "steerer" for drug 
sellers,'60 that a particular location appeared to be a narcotics "shoot- 
ing gallery,"161 or that furtive activity indicated that a sale of narcotics 
was taking place,162 or that ambiguous scribblings constituted notes of 
narcotics ~ a 1 e s . l ~ ~  Rarely do the courts take note of the dangers from 
such conclusory te~t im0ny. l~~ 
g. New Forensic Proof 
New forensic techniques have revolutionized prosecutions. DNA 
"fingerprinting," for example, has been hailed as the "single greatest 
advance in the 'search for truth' since the advent of cross-examina- 
147. N Y C~lar  PROC LAW 3 60.43 (McKinney 1981) (evidence of victim's sexual conduct 
in  nun-sex olTense cases inadmissible unless judge determines evidence to be relevant and admissi- 
ble in interest of justice). 
148. FED R EVID 704 ("testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admis- 
sible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact"). 
149. See Phylis S. Bamberger. The Dangerous Expert Witness, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 855 
( 1986). 
150. United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397, 400-01 (2d Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1141 (1986). 
151. United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 
1084 (1985). 
152. United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108 
( 1983). 
153. United States v. Duarte. 950 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1991). 
154. See Bamberger, supra note 149. See also United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227 (2d 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Long. 917 F.2d 691, 702 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Brown. 776 
F.2d 397. 401 (2d Cir. 1985) ("there is something rather offensive in allowing an investigating 
oliicer to testify not simply that a certain pattern of conduct is often found in narcotics cases, 
leaving i t  for the jury to determine whether the defendant's conduct fits the pattern, but also that 
\uch conduct fitted that pattern, at least when other inferences could have been drawn not unrea- 
tonably although perhaps not as reasonably as that to which the expert testified"). 
Heinonline - -  53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 415 1991-1992 
416 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:393 
t i ~ n . " l ~ ~  Experts contend that DNA testing can prove with near-perfect 
accuracy the identity of a rapist or murderer.166 Federal and state 
courts increasingly have accepted such proof, making it possible for 
prosecutors to gain convictions in cases that previously might not even 
have been brought.16' 
h. Compelling Cooperation 
One of the most significant developments in skewing the balance 
of power in criminal procedure has been the prosecutor's enhanced 
ability to force witnesses to provide information and to cooperate by 
giving testimony.168 The combination of the prosecutor's vast charging 
power coupled with mandatory sentencing laws enables prosecutors 
more than ever to force persons to cooperate with the prosecution, and 
to punish their failure to cooperate.16D The ability of prosecutors to use 
immunity laws to compel reluctant witnesses to divulge information has 
been strengthened.160 Indeed, immunity litigation graphically illustrates 
the disparity between the prosecution and defense. Courts have consist- 
ently held that prosecutors have the exclusive authority to select those 
155. People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (1988). affd sub nom. People v. Bailay, 549 
N.Y.S.2d 846 (1989). app. denied, 551 N.E.2d 1238 (1990). 
156. Herbert Moss, DNA-The New Fingerprints, 74 A.B.A. J. May 1, 1988 at 66. See 
Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391, 392 n.7 (Md. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 565 A.2d 670 (1989). 
Cellmark Diagnostics Corporation, located in Germantown, Maryland, one of the commercial lab- 
oratories marketing DNA testing. states that its DNA fingerprint test can identify a suspect with 
"virtual certainty." and that the chance that any two people have the same DNA are one in 30 
billion. Id. at 392 n.7. 
157. United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D.C. Vt. 1990). affd,  1992 U.S. App. 
LEXlS 322 (Jan. 9, 1992); State v. Davis, 814 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1991). cert. denied, 1992 U.S. 
LEXlS 67 (Jan. 13, 1992); Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144 (Kan. 1991); Caldwell v. State, 393 
S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 1093 (1990); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 
2d 841 (Fla. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. Bx. Co. 1989). But 
see Commonwealth v. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 1991) (DNA results held invalid based on 
questionable testing); Ex Parre Perry, 586 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 1991) (foundation for DNA test 
results inadequate). 
158. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and state immunity statutes, the prosecutor 
is the exclusive determiner of whether a person will be rewarded for giving assistance to law 
enforcement. On that determination hangs a person's life and liberty, or possible death sentence. 
See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (prosecutor's unilateral determination that defendant 
broke plea bargain resulted in reinstatement of capital murder charge). 
159. See infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text. In Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 
552 (1 980). the Supreme Court held that the defendant's failure to cooperate with the government 
may be urged by the prosecutor as a reason against lenity in the sentence. 
160. See United States v. Mandjuano, 425 U.S. 564, 575 (1976); Kastigar v. United States, 
406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
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persons who will be granted immunity, and those who will not be.lsl 
With minor exceptions,,ls2 the courts have refused to impose any re- 
strictions on the prosecutor's immunity-granting power, such as requir- 
ing an equitable distribution of immunity to the defense where the 
prosecutor has already granted immunity to an important prosecution 
i. Burden ,of Proof and Presumptions 
Legislatures and courts are sensitive to burden-of-proof issues in 
criminal prosecutions, and occasionally have sought to lessen the prose- 
cutor's burden. For example, as a result of the prosecution of John 
Hinckley for attempting to assassinate President Reagan, Congress 
amended the insanity defense to shift the burden of proof from the 
prosecutor to the defense on the issue of legal insanity.lB4 As a result of 
that change, the prosecutor is no longer required to disprove insanity;ls6 
the burden now has been placed on the defense to prove insanity by 
clear and convincing evidence.1B6 Other burden-of-proof issues that 
often raise serious due process claims have been decided in the prosecu- 
161. See Blissett V. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1991). cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 158 
(1991): United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 
(1981): United States v. Bowling, 666 F.2d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1981). cerr. denied, 455 U.S. 960 
(1982): Nebraska v. Ammons, 305 N.W.2d 808 (Neb. 1981). 
162. United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1991); Virgin Islands v. Smith. 
615 F.7d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 
People v. Goetz, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1987). 
163. See Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 533-34 (D.C. Cir. 1966). cert. denied, 388 
U.S. 921 (1967) (Circuit Judge Burger suggesting that the prosecutor's immunity granting power 
\hould not be used in a one-sided manner as to deny a defendant a fair trial). 
In addition, there is generally no requirement that a prosecutor disclose the identity of an 
informant. See United States v. Bourbon. 819 F.2d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Scnfe. 872 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1987). Nor is there a requirement that prosecution witnesses be 
ordered to talk to defense counsel. United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1987). 
However, a prosecutor must not "obstruct communication between prospective witnesses and de- 
fense counsel." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5 3-3.l(c) (2d ed. 1986); see Gregory v. 
United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
164. See Donald H.J. Hermann, Assault on the Insanity Defense: Linlirations on the Eflec- 
tirene.~s and Eflecr of the Defense of Insanity, 14 RUT. L.J. 241 (1983); Peter Arenella, Refic- 
lions on Current Proposals to Abolish or Reform rhe Insanity Defense, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 271 
(19x2). 
165. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); W.E. Shipley, Annotations, Modern Sla- 
rlrs of Rules as to Burden and Suftiriency of Proof of Mental Irresponsibility in Criminal Cases. 
17 i1.L.R. 3d 146 (1968). 
166. See 18 U.S.C. $ 17(b) (1989), which was added as part of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control / k t  of 1984. In more than half the states the defendant now must prove insanity by a 
preponderance of the evidence. H.R. REP. NO. 577. 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983). 
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tor's favor on the merits,le7 or found to be harmless error.les By the 
same token, conclusive presumptions, such as the age of the victim,168 
or permissive presumptions, such as the rule that guns or drugs found 
in an automobile or an apartment are presumed to be in the possession 
of all occupants,170 have been upheld against due process challenges.171 
4. Sentencing Power 
a. Sentencing Guidelines 
The prosecutor has traditionally played a crucial role at sentenc- 
ing.172 That role has expanded dramatically as a result of the Sentenc- 
ing Reform Act of 1984, which produced the Federal Sentencing 
G~ide1ines . l~~ The Guidelines were specifically designed to restrict the 
discretion of judges in imposing sentences.174 Such restriction has pro- 
167. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 
(1987). One of the controversial issues in criminal forfeiture law is the burden of proving forfei- 
turc. Several courts have relieved the prosecutor of the burden of proving forfeiture beyond a 
reasonable doubt. and require only a preponderance of evidence. See United States v. Herrera. 
893 F.2d 15 12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 10 S. Ct. 2623 (1990); United States v. Sandini, 8 16 F.2d 
869 (3d Cir. 1987). 
168. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) Cjudge's refusal to give instruction on the 
presumption of innocence harmless error); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) Cjury instruction 
containing erroneous rebuttable presumption harmless error). 
169. See, e.g.. MODEL PENAL CODE 3 216.6(1); N.Y. PENAL LAW 3 15.20(3) (McKinney 
1987). 
170. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW 3 265.15 (McKinney 1989) (presumption of possession of 
weapon from presence in automobile or dwelling); N.Y. PENAL LAW 220.25 (McKinney 1989) 
(presumption of possession of drugs from presence in automobile or dwelling). 
171. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). The prosecutor also enjoys the bene- 
fit of increasingly favorable standards of appellate review that seek to preserve convictions. See 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (applicable standard to sustain conviction is 
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
172. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 18-6.3(a) (2d ed. 1986) (prosecutor 
responsible for assisting sentencing court "as helpful a manner as possible"). The prosecutor's 
influence on the sentencing decision traditionally has resulted from his initial decision on the na- 
ture and extent of the charges brought; whether to invoke special offender or habitual offender 
statutes (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3 924(c), § 3576); whether to permit the defendant to plead guilty: 
whether to recommend leniency based on the defendant's cooperation with law enforcement. The 
prosecutor also has an obligation to make all relevant information bearing on sentence accessible 
to lhc sentencing court. 
173. The Sentencing Guidelines were a product of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 
U.S.C. 3 3551 and 28 U.S.C. $3  991-998 (1988). The Supreme Court upheld the Guidelines 
against constitutional challenges based on separation of powers and delegation of authority. Mis- 
trclta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
174. United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir. 1990). Arguments support- 
ing the new sentencing power have pointed out that the sentencing function historically has been a 
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duced a corresponding enhancement in the prosecutor's discretion to 
make charging decisions and to force persons to cooperate. One federal 
district judge has characterized the expanded prosecutorial power 
under the new sentencing regime as possibly "the most fundamental 
change in the criminal justice system to have occurred within the past 
generati~n." '~~ Several aspects of the prosecutor's new power under the 
Guidelines raise extremely troubling questions: the prosecutor's exclu- 
sive power to have the defendant's sentence reduced due to his coopera- 
tion; the prosecutor's ability unilaterally to dismiss charges to avoid ev- 
identiary and procedural obstacles at trial, but to then use the same 
acts underlying those unproven charges to enhance punishment under 
much more lenient standards of proof; and the prosecutor's ability to 
manipulate the charges to undermine other constitutional protections, 
such as due process and the right to a speedy trial. Moreover, the pros- 
ecutor's power to manipulate capital sentencing decisions continues to 
make the death penalty the most arbitrary form of punishment in 
America. 
b. Rewarding Cooperation 
The most important provision in the Guidelines enabling a court to 
impose a lesser sentence is Guideline 5Kl.1,  which authorizes the pros- 
ecutor to notify the sentencing court that the defendant has rendered 
"substantial assistance" to the government in the investigation and 
prosecution of crime and thus permits a "downward departure" from 
the Guidelines sentence.176 Without the prosecutor's motion for a 
downward departure based on the defendant's cooperation, the court 
must impose the sentence required under the G~ide1ines . l~~ The prose- 
shared responsibility among the three branches of government, Mistretfa, 488 U.S. a t  390, that a 
defendant has no constitutional right to individualized sentencing, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 
602 (1978). that Congress could have removed all judicial discretion from the Guidelines, and 
therefore could guide that discretion through the Guidelines. United States v. White, 869 F.2d 
822, 825 (5th Cir.), cerf. denied, 490 U.S. 1 1  12, and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1001 (1989). 
175. United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (D.D.C. 1989) (Greene, J.). "The 
Guidelines are a dismal failure, a cancer of the federal criminal justice system." John Taylor, The 
Fedrrul Sentencing Guidelines, AMERICAN LAWYER, Jan. 23, 1992 at  6. Professor Alschuler has 
deplored the "mechanistic and dehumanizing" aspects of the Guidelines. Albert W. Alschuler. 
Fail~tre ojsenfencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 CHI L REV. 901 (1991). See 
also Gerald W. Heaney, The Realities of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AMER. 
GRIM L REV 161 (1991). 
176. 18 U.S.C. 3 3553(e) (1988); Guideline 5kl.l. 
177. United States v. Bruno. 897 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Lewis. 896 F.2d 
246 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 1 1  1 S. Ct. 433 
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cutor thus becomes the sole arbiter of whether a defendant may receive 
a downward departure. Moreover, although the circuits have differed 
on the standard of review governing the prosecutor's refusal to make a 
motion for such a departure,17s all of the courts agree that the standard 
is very high.170 Some courts will review the prosecutor's decision only if 
the defendant establishes that the prosecutor's refusal was made in bad 
faith or was arbitrary.lsO Other courts have suggested that absent a 
plea agreement, the prosecutor's decision is immune from judicial re- 
view even if bad faith is shown.lsl This results in the courts tolerating 
blatant infringements of constitutional rights. 
c. Punishment for Untried and Unproved Crimes 
The Guidelines have empowered prosecutors to introduce at sen- 
tencing hearings crimes that are far more serious than the crimes of 
which the defendant was convicted, but which have not been proven at 
trial. Given the lesser procedural protections and evidentiary standards 
at a sentencing proceeding than in a trial, there exists the temptation 
for prosecutors to withhold proof of such crimes until sentencing. Prob- 
ably the most dramatic example of a sentencing hearing that functions 
as "a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense" is United 
States v. Kikumura.lB2 
In Kikumura, the defendant was convicted of several passport and 
(1990); United States v. Francois, 889 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1989). cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 
(1990). But see United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1234 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 1 l 1 S. 
Ct. 710 (1991); United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958 
(1989); United States v. Curran, 724 F. Supp. 1239 (C.D. Ill. 1989). 
178. Compare United States v. Gonzalez, 927 F.2d 139, 145-46 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991) (even if  
prosecutor's decision not to move under Guideline 5kl.l is made in bad faith, it is not subject to 
judicial review) with United States v. Villarino, 930 F.2d 1527, 1530 (I lth Cir. 1991) (prosecu- 
tor's decision not to move under Guideline 5kl.l is reviewable to determine whether the prosecu- 
tor acted in,good faith) with United States v. Donatiu, 922 F.2d 1331, 1335 (7th Cir. 1991) (if 
prosecutor's refusal to make motion was "objectively reasonable," district court may not review 
that refusal merely because defendant alleges bad faith or vindictiveness). 
179. Id. 
180. United States v. Hubers, 938 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 427 (1991); 
United States v. Mena, 925 F.2d 354, 355-56 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bayles. 923 F.2d 
70, 72 (7th Cir. 1991). 
181. United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713 (2d Cir. 1989). cert. denied, 1 1 1 S. Ct. 
433 (1990); United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. grunted. 112 S. Ct. 635 
(1991). 
182. 918 F.2d 1084, 1 101 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79. 
88 (1986)). McMillan, a pre-Guidelines case, said that sentencing judge could hear evidence and 
find facts without any prescribed burden of proof so long as there is no legislation to the contrary. 
McMiIlan. 477 U.S. at 91. 
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weapons offenses having a sentencing range of between 27 and 33 
months. The prosecutor introduced proof at  the sentencing hearing that 
the defendant had manufactured three lethal home-made firebombs in 
preparation for a major terrorist bombing on American soil. Based on 
this conduct, for which the defendant was neither tried nor convicted, 
the district judge imposed a sentence of 30 years imprisonment, the 
largest departure since the Guidelines became effective. The Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that such a departure was legally 
permissible. Although he concurred in the result on preservation 
grounds,lS3 Judge Rosenn expressed his concern that by deliberately 
collateralizing the most serious crimes for later use at sentencing, the 
prosecutor may have violated the defendant's right to due process.le4 
d.  Manipulation of Guidelines 
Prosecutors have manipulated the Guidelines in retaliation for de- 
fendants' exercise of constitutional rights. In United States v. 
for example, the defendants claimed that the prosecutor's transfer of 
their cases from local court to federal court was a vindictive response to 
take advantage of the much harsher sentences under the Guidelines, in 
retaliation for the defendants' refusal to plead guilty in local court. The 
district court dismissed the  indictment^,'^^ finding that the prosecutor 
had violated due process and the right to a speedy trial by arbitrarily 
selecting certain defendants for enhanced punishment after they had 
refused to plead guilty.lS7 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
183. Kiklmiura, 9 18 F.2d at  1 1 19. Judge Rosenn noted that the defendant failed to raise 
the objections on appeal, and the government had no opportunity to respond. Id. at 1121. 
184. As Judge Rosenn observed, "Kikumura should have been charged and tried for that 
olTense [attempted murder]. Failure to do so should preclude the Government from relying upon 
the separate crime of attempted murder as the vehicle for the drastic enhancement of the defend- 
ant's sentence." Id. at 1120. See also United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 
1991) (en banc) (standard of proof of preponderance of evidence usually appropriate to prove 
factors to enhance sentence). 
185. 925 F.2d 455. 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
186. United States v. Holland, 729 F. Supp. 125. 132 (D.D.C. 1990); United States v. Rob- 
erts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1377 (D.D.C. 1989). rev'd sub nom. United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 
(D.C. Cir. 1991). 
187. Holland. 729 F. Supp. a t  132; Roberts, 726 F. Supp. a t  1377. In Holland the district 
court found a violation of the Speedy Trial Act because the federal indictment was filed well 
beyond the 30-day limit. Holland, 729 F. Supp. at 130, 132; see also 18 U.S.C. jj 3 161 (b) (1988) 
(setting forth 30 day limit under Speedy Trial Act). The due process violation was found in the 
pro.;ecutor's abuse of power by timing the transfers shortly after the defendants' rejections of the 
plea offers. 
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reversed,188 upholding the prosecutor's discretion against the claim of 
vindi~tiveness.'~~ 
e. Capital Sentencing 
It is becoming increasingly evident that capital cases, from begin- 
ning to end, represent an extraordinary instance of the prosecutor's use 
and abuse of power.lgO As indicated above, the prosecutor's decision to 
seek the death penalty is immune from judicial review, even if it can be 
convincingly shown that the decision was racially motivated.lgl More- 
over, the prosecutor's ability to obtain a capital conviction has been 
enhanced by his ability to select a conviction-prone jury.lg2 Addition- 
ally, the spectre of the death penalty provides the prosecutor with pow- 
erful leverage to secure convictions through guilty pleas.lg3 Capital sen- 
tencing also provides prosecutors with a forum to engage in 
overwhelming rhetoric designed to convince the jury to impose death.lS4 
188. Mills, 925 F.2d at 463-64. The court, however, remanded the case to determine 
whether the transfer decision violated the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 
Mills. 925 F.2d at  465. The court cited Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). for the 
proposition that the Sixth Amendment right, unlike the statutory right, turns not on precise time 
periods but rather on a broad balancing of considerations, which include the length of the delay 
before trial, the reasons for the delay, the vigor with which the defendant asserted his speedy trial 
right, and the degree of prejudice to the defendant. Mills, 925 F.2d at 464. 
189. Courts have held that when a defendant is arrested on nonfederal charges, the federal 
speedy trial "clock" does not begin to run until federal charges are actually filed. United States v. 
Charles, 883 F.2d 355, 356 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 750 (1990). A District of 
Columbia arrest has been treated as a state arrest. United States v. Robertson, 810 F.2d 254, 256- 
58 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
190. See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1988) (prosecutor instructed jury 
commissioners to underrepresent blacks and other minorities in jury pool); Lindsey v. King. 769 
F.2d 1034, 1036-39 (5th Cir. 1985) (prosecutor withheld evidence that key prosecution witness 
had told police he could not identify perpetrator). 
191. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text. 
192. See Lockhart v. McCee, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (in holding that states may exclude 
from capital juries persons who would never be able to vote for death penalty, Court found it 
constitutionally irrelevant that such exclusions could produce conviction-prone juries); Buchanan 
v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 414-20 (1987); Tabak & Lane, supra note 108, at 66. 
193. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (threat of execution permissible coercion 
in persuading defendant to plead to lesser degree of murder). See Tabak & Lane, supra note 108. 
at 66. See also WELSH S. WHITE. THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES. AN EXARI~NAT~ON Ub 
THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHRIENT 40 (1987). 
194. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 
(1985); Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204, 210 (5th Cir. 1988). cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 
(1989) (taxpayers would save money if defendant executed); Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 
1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1987). cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988) (society has right to self-defense 
against defendant); Harich v. Wainwright, 813 F.2d 1082, 1095 (I 1 th Cir.), reh'g granted. 828 
F.2d 1497 (I lth Cir. 1987) (prosecutor tells jury defendant's murder the most heinous. atrocious. 
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The Supreme Court has condoned various prosecutorial excesses in 
sentencing  proceeding^,'^^ and has relaxed evidentiary restrictions on 
the use of inflammatory evidence. Thus, in Payne v. Tennessee,lB8 the 
Court overruled recent precedents,lB7 and validated the admission of 
evidence at capital sentencing hearings to prove that the murder com- 
mitted by the defendant had an adverse impact on the victim's family. 
Before Payne, because "death is different,"lB8 the Supreme Court be- 
lieved that it was appropriate to make evidentiary distinctions that al- 
lowed proof of factors that mitigated against the death penalty, while 
disallowing proof of aggravating factors felt not to be relevant.leB The 
Court no longer believes that this distinction is valid. The Court now 
apparently believes that the ability of a defendant to avoid death 
should be equated with the ability of the prosecutor to prove the value 
of the deceased's life. This is a perverse position to take. The worth of 
the deceased will invariably be shown to be more valuable than the life 
of the killer. This inflammatory proof unfairly increases the likelihood 
of execution. 
and evil he has ever known); Drake v. Kemp. 762 F.2d 1449 (I lth Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1020 (1986); Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1002 
(1984); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 643-44 (Pa. 1991). See Welsh S. White, 
Prosecutors' Closing Arguments at the Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 297 
(1991); Tabak & Lane. supra note 108, at 67; Ursula Bentele, The Death Penalty in Georgia: 
Still Arbitrary, 62 WASH U L Q  573 (1985). 
195. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Zant v. Stephens. 462 U.S. 862 (1983); 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). 
196. I 1  1 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
197. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 
(1987). The Court in Payne explained its willingness to overrule recent precedents that were 
"wrongly decided." 
Booth and Gathers were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents chal- 
lenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions. They have been questioned by members 
of the Court in later decisions, and have defied consistent application by the lower courts. 
Payne v. Tennessee, 1 1 l S. Ct. 2597, 2610-1 1 (1991). 
Justice Marshall, in dissent, wrote: 
Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decision-making . . . The implica- 
tions of this radical new exception to the doctrine of stare decisis are staggering. The 
majority today sends a clear signal that scores of established constitutional liberties are 
now ripe for reconsideration, thereby inviting the very type of open defiance of our prece- 
dents that the majority rewards in this case. 
Id. at 261 9. 
198. Gregg. 428 U.S. at 188 (Court has "recognize[d] that the penalty of death is different 
in kind from any other punishment imposed under out system of criminal justice"). See also the 
Court's plurality decisions in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) and Woodson v. North Caro- 
lina. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
199. Gathers. 490 U.S. at 805; Booth, 482 U.S. at 496. 
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B. From Deterrence to License 
The judiciary's willingness to use its power to deter governmental 
misconduct has been one of the overriding themes in modern criminal 
procedure. The Warren Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence 
sought to protect the rights of criminal defendants, in part, by estab- 
lishing rules of proper conduct for prosecutors.200 A major rationale for 
the exclusionary rule was to deter governmental violations of constitu- 
tional rights.201 Similarly, a principal purpose of the use of supervisory 
power was to curb governmental conduct.202 The erosion of the exclu- 
sionary rule has signaled the Court's rejection of deterrence as a goal 
of criminal justice policy in favor of a conviction-oriented 
This transition has been supported by the expanded use of harmless 
error review, the demise of supervisory power, and the dilution of stan- 
dards for prosecutorial conduct, which tacitly have granted prosecutors 
a license to "strike foul 
1. Expansion of Harmless Error 
The harmless error rule authorizes appellate courts to affirm a 
conviction when the defendant's guilt is clear, even though he may have 
received an unfair trial.206 The rule has been described as "insidi- 
O U S , " ~ ~ ~  for the way it insulates from appellate sanction flagrant consti- 
tutional as well as non-constitutional violations, and and 
200. See, e.g.. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (misconduct in presenting evidence): Grif- 
fin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (improper closing argument to jury); Brady v. Maryland. 
373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of exculpatory evidence). 
201. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) ("the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to 
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way-by 
removing the incentive to disregard it"', quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 
(1960)). 
202. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 n.8 (1980) ("deterring illegality" one of 
principal purposes of supervisory power). 
203. Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution in Crintittal Proce- 
dure: The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 24 W ~ s r l  L J 471 
(1985). 
204. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("while [the prosecutor] may strikc 
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones"). 
205. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588-589 (1986) (Stevens. J., concurring): Albert W. 
Alschuler, Counroon~ Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX L REV 629, 646-47 
(1972). 
206. ~te;en H. Goldberg. Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, J CRIM L 6i 
CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1980). 
207. Stephen A. Saltzburg. The Harm of Harmless Error. 59 VA.  L REV 988.998 (1973). 
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for its standardless and ad hoc application. The rule 
originally developed as an appellate device to prevent "the mere eti- 
quette of trials" or the "minutiae of procedure" from upsetting a ver- 
di~t.~OO The rule has developed into the most powerful judicial weapon 
to preserve convictions whenever an appellate tribunal, sitting as a 
6 6  super-jury," concludes that the defendant is clearly guilty. The harm- 
less error rule thus modifies prosecutorial behavior in the most perni- 
cious fashion: it tacitly informs prosecutors that they can weigh the 
commission of evidentiary or procedural violations not against a legal 
or ethical standard of appropriate conduct, but rather, against an in- 
creasingly accurate prediction that the appellate courts will ignore the 
misconduct when sufficient evidence exists to prove the defendant's 
guilt.210 
The harmless error rule has been a jurisprudential fiasco. The rule 
was never intended to sanction the denial of a fair trial.211 As Justice 
208. ROGER J. TRAYNOR. THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 13 (1970). 
209. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.). 
210. Professor Goldberg has described the behavioral consequences on prosecutors resulting 
from the judiciary's increased reliance on harmless error review. 
Every time an error is declared harmless in a particular situation, it diminishes the risk to 
the prosecutor in the use of the evidence or the technique. The lessening of the risk is 
added into a formula which favors risk-taking based upon the doctrine alone. In a sense, 
the doctrine encourages the prosecutor to use the evidence or the technique in every case. 
Initially, there are three possibilities: (1) the evidence or technique does not involve any 
error. (2) if the evidence or technique involves error, it will be harmless, and (3) the evi- 
dence or technique involves error that will cause a reversal because the remainder of the 
evidence is not "overwhelming." What should the intelligent and conscientious risk assessor 
do? The first two possibilities present no question. If there is no error there is no problem, 
and if the error is harmless the only problem is the time and expense of an appeal. The 
result is the same: a legal conviction. Convictions which are legal are, after all, what the 
society pays the prosecutor to obtain. The third choice is the problem. The court has de- 
fined a doctrine of harmless constitutional error which says to a prosecutor that if the case 
is not overwhelming any error will cause a reversal, and if it is overwhelming, no worry. 
The prosecutor then looks a t  the case and determines that it is not very strong. Use of the 
evidence or technique has two chances of success-no error and harmless-and one chance 
of failure. By the Court's definition of "harmless," that one chance of failure demands that 
the evidence or technique be crucial to the prosecutor's case. The prosecutor has no advo- 
cate's choice which mitigates in favor of not using the evidence or technique. Even if the 
prosecutor believes the case is strong, the likelihood is that the evidence or technique will 
be used. The odds are still two-to-one. Further. the advocate's predilection to cover every 
bdse is reinforced by the doctrine's admonition: if the evidence or technique is not needed 
by the advocate it is not likely to cause a reversal. 
Goldberg, supra note 206, at 439-40. 
21 1. Indeed, the harmless error rule is being used to redefine constitutional rights under an 
outcome-determinative analysis. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 685-86 (1986) 
(White, J.. concurring) (recommending that the Court should conclude that there was no violation 
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Frankfurter wrote in Bollenbach v. United States,212 "the question is 
not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt has 
been found by a jury according to the procedure and standards appro- 
priate for criminal trials in the federal courts." However, four decades 
later, a majority of the Supreme Court would observe: "Where a re- 
viewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satis- 
fied and the judgment should be affirmed."213 And just last Term, in a 
startling overruling of a long-established precedent,214 five Justices con- 
cluded that the admission at trial against a defendant of his coerced 
confession could be harmless error.215 The feverish intensity with which 
courts throughout the country have invoked harmless error to ignore 
serious evidentiary and procedural violations216 inevitably invites the 
cynical response that "if [a defendant] is obviously guilty as charged, 
he has no fundamental right to be tried fairly."217 
The purpose of this discussion is not so much to point out the es- 
sential absurdity of harmless error review, or its misuse in particular 
of Confrontation Clause when no prejudice was demonstrated, rather than concluding that 
prejudice was shown, but that it was harmless). Justice White's opinion is very troubling for its 
willingness to so casually redefine constitutional rights based on the particular harm. See Michael 
T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process: There's More ro 
Due Process Than the Bottom Line, 88 COLULI. L. REV. 1298 (1988). Just as disturbing is the fact 
it was Justice White's dissenting opinion in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-542 (1976). that 
proved to be so influential in the Court's ultimate adoption of the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
212. 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946). 
213. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). 
214. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1 967) ("[Tlhere are some constitutional 
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error." one 
example being the use of a coerced confession against a defendant.). 
215. Arizona v. Fulminante, 11 1 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 
majority in Fzilntinante, made the distinction between "trial errors," every one of which could be 
considered harmless error, and so-called "structural defects," which cannot be harmless. Two such 
structural defects which "defy analysis by 'harmless error' standards" are the total deprivation of 
the right to counsel at trial, guaranteed by Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). and the 
right to an impartial judge, guaranteed by Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Fulminattre, I I I 
S. Ct. at 1263-65. 
216. The federal courts are using an even broader harmless error test when a constitutional 
claim is raised collaterally on habeas corpus. Under the test set forth in Chapman v. California. 
386 U.S. 18 (1967). the standard on direct appeal for assessing whether reversal is required is 
whether the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. One new standard to be applied on 
habeas review is whether the violation "had substantial or injurious effect and influence in deter- 
mining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson. 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991). 
217. Note, Proseczitor Indiscretion: A Result of Polirical Influence. 34 I N D .  L J 477. 486 
(1959). 
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cases. Rather, it is to suggest the noxious effect of the rule on 
prosecutorial behavior. There is a close connection between the expan- 
sion of harmless error review and the rise of the New Prosecutor. In- 
deed, the most sinister effect of the recent escalation of harmless error 
review has been in its capacity to unleash prosecutors from the re- 
straining threat of appellate reversal. Commenting on the "corrosive 
impact" of the harmless error rule on prosecutorial behavior, Justice 
Stevens wrote that "an automatic application of harmless-error review 
in case after case, and for error after error, can only encourage prose- 
cutors to subordinate the interest in respecting the Constitution to the 
ever-present and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a 
particular 
Initially, prosecutors are well aware of the judiciary's inability to 
accurately measure harmless error. Appellate judges are poorly 
equipped to determine reliably from "the cold black and white of a 
printed recordW2l9 the impact upon the jury of various evidentiary or 
procedural violations. Many appellate judges have never sat as trial 
and therefore have had no experience administering a trial, 
sitting as fact-finders themselves, ruling on the admissibility of evi- 
dence, dealing with attorney conduct, and instructing juries on the law, 
to name just a few of the situations in which trial error or misconduct 
can occur. Moreover, it is virtually impossible for appellate judges to 
assess from a "dead recordmZ2l the demeanor of the participants and 
the reactions of the A good example of the futility of measur- 
ing the impact of inflammatory prosecutorial conduct is Darden v. 
W a i n ~ r i g h t . ~ ~ ~  
In Darden, the prosecutor in argument to the jury characterized 
218. Rose v. Clark. 478 U.S. 570, 588-89 (concurring opinion). 
219. United States v. Grunberger. 431 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1970). 
220. A sunfey of the biographies of all sitting federal appellate judges shows that almost. 
one-half of these judges have had no experience as trial judges. State appellate judges have rela- 
tively more trial-judge experience than federal judges. 
221. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 615 (1946). 
222. See State v. Forte. 572 A.2d 941, 942 (Vt. 1990) (quoting La Barge Water Well 
Supply Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 1963)) ("Even if we were to find scant 
support in the record for the new trial ruling, we are hard pressed to review what the trial court 
saw or heard. The demeanor of the participants and the reactions of the jurors to the [prosecu- 
tor's] conduct are difficult, if not impossible, to assess on review of the record."). See generally 
Peter D. Blanck, Note, The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in 
Crinrirral Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985) (empirically investigating the ability of trial 
psrticipants to communicate through nonverbal behavior). 
223. 477 U.S. 168 (1986). 
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the defendant as an "animal;" told the jury that the only guarantee 
against his committing future crimes would be to execute him; that he 
should have "a leash on him;" and that he should have "his face blown 
away by a shotgun."224 The Supreme Court split 5-4 on whether these 
comments were harmless. The majority believed they were harmless, 
echoing familiar language used to preserve convictions: "Darden's trial 
was not perfect-few are-but neither was it fundamentally unfair."226 
No one, of course, will ever know the extent to which the jury was 
influenced by the prosecutor's patently improper remarks. After 
Darden, however, it would be a fairly safe guess that prosecutors, when 
choosing between restrained or inflammatory rhetoric, would be more 
likely to choose the latter.226 
224. Id. at  180 n.12. 
225. Id. at  183 (quoting Dardan v. Wainwright, 513 F. Supp. 947, 958 (M.D. Fla. 1981)). 
226. See, e.g., United States v. Weiss, 930 F.2d 185, 196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
133 (1991) (prosecutor's allusions to greed in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice were not suffi- 
ciently shown to be anti-Semitic references, although prosecutor "could have chosen his words 
more carefully"); United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1991) (prosecutor 
"mischaracterized the jury's role" by alluding to the grand jury's indictment as proof that case 
was a "federal case" but remarks were harmless); Fisher v. Nix, 920 F.2d 549, 552 (8th Cir. 
1990) (prosecutor's "misleading" remarks were harmless); United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 
1403, 1425 (10th Cir. 1990) (court does not decide whether prosecutor's "highly improper" re- 
marks that denigrated role of jury would have been basis for reversal); United States v. Smith. 
918 F.2d 1551, 1562-63 (I  l th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's appeal to jury to act as conscience of the 
community not improper when not "intended to inflame"); United States v. Phillips, 914 F.2d 
835, 845 (7th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's remarks that defendant a "liar," a "clumsy thick tongued 
thug," and a "bozo" improper but harmless); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 894-95 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990). cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991) (prosecutor's statement that defendant used tac- 
tics favored by Adolph Hitler inflammatory but harmless); United States v. Machor. 879 F.2d 945 
(1st Cir. 1989). cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 and 493 U.S. 1094 (1991) (prosecutor's inflammatory 
statement that drugs "are poisoning our community and our kids die because of this" harmless); 
United States v. Parker, 869 F.2d 1377, 1390 (10th Cir. 1989) (inflammatory reference to vic- 
tim's death harmless); Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989). cert. denied, 494 U.S. 
1090 (1990); United States v. Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1989) (improper racial 
reference to "Cuban drug dealer" harmless); United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153. 
158-59 (1st Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's reference to defendant as "liar" and "crook" improper but 
harmless); Hopkinson v. Shillenger, 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's expression of 
fear after murder of prospective witness improper but harmless); Shepard v. Lane. 818 F.2d 615. 
621-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929 (1987) (calling defendant liar, dog, animal, and 
stating it was too bad arresting officer had not broken defendant's skull "grossly improper" but 
harmless); Clark v. Wood, 823 F.2d 1241, 1251 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987) 
(calling defendant a master liar, and that many persons believe he is "100% guilty" improper but 
harmless); United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1395 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 1068 (1988) (derogatory remarks about defense lawyer improper but harmless); United 
States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 133 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855 (1987) (comparing de- 
fendant's denial of criminal intent with Peter's denial of Christ grossly improper but harmless); 
United States v. Lowenberg, 853 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032 
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Even decisions that impose significant restrictions on prosecutorial 
misconduct may be ignored by prosecutors who evaluate prospective 
misbehavior under a harmless error calculation. A good illustration is 
Grifln v. Calif~rnia.~~'  There, the Supreme Court reversed a murder 
conviction on the grounds that the prosecutor's comments on the de- 
fendant's silence violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self- 
i n c r i m i n a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Despite Grifin, prosecutors have repeatedly com- 
mented on the defendant's silence, and the appellate courts often have 
upheld the convictions by finding that the comments were harmless.229 
There is little doubt that prosecutors make these comments with full 
knowledge that they are committing a constitutional violation and de- 
spite repeated criticism by the appellate courts, have continued to vio- 
late the rule. When one appellate court, after repeated warnings, finally 
reversed a conviction, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, 
finding that the error was harmless.230 This message is not lost on pros- 
ecutors. Rather than being deterred from committing misconduct, they 
(1989) (calling defendant a "filthy pimp" and his lawyer a "jack-in-the-box" for making repeated 
objections improper but harmless); United States v. O'Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1428-29 (8th 
Cir.). cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 and 488 U.S. 101 1 (1989) (inflammatory and unfounded re- 
marks about defense counsel harmless); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041, 1049-50 (5th 
Cir.). cerr. denied. 486 U.S. 1024 (1988) (claiming that defense counsel suborned perjury "repre- 
henbible" but harmless). 
227. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
228. The prosecutor's remarks overtly alluded to the defendant's silence, advising the jury: 
He (defendant) would know that. He would know how she got down the alley. He would 
know how the blood got on the bottom of the concrete steps. He would know how long he 
was with her in that box. He would know how her wig got off. He would know whether he 
beat her or mistreated her. He would know whether he walked away from that place cool 
as a cucumb~r when he saw Mr. Villasenor because he was conscious of his own guilt and 
wanted to get away from that damaged or injured woman. 
These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain. 
And in the whole world. if anybody would know, this defendant would know. 
Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell you her side of the story. The defendant won't. 
Id. at 61 1. 
229. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983); United States v. Le Quire, 
943 F.2d 1554 (I lth Cir. 1991); United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1990). cert. 
drriitd. 112 S. Ct. 134 (1991); United States v. Shakur, 888 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1989). cert. de- 
nied. 493 U.S. 1087 and 110 S. Ct. 1485 (1990); United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382 (7th 
Cir. 1987). cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988); United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43, 44 (1st 
Cir. 1985); United States v. Lavoie, 721 F.2d 407, 408-09 (1st Cir. 1983). cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1069 ( 1984); Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ga. 1989). a T d ,  908 F.2d 719 (I 1 th 
Cir. 1990); United States ex reel. Burns v. Haws, 717 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. 111. 1989). 
230. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
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are tacitly given a license to do so if they think that they can get away 
with it.231 
That prosecutors actually do assess the risks and benefits associ- 
ated with misconduct is an intuitively, anecdotally, and empirically 
well-founded conclusion. Intuition alone suggests that much unethical 
behavior by prosecutors is not inadvertent.232 Prosecutors are knowl- 
edgeable and experienced lawyers who understand and are trained to 
apply legal and ethical rules. They prepare their cases thoroughly, and 
carefully rehearse the testimony of their witnesses. Prosecutors ordina- 
rily accumulate substantial impeachment material to cross-examine the 
defendant and his witnesses. They know in advance the precise extent 
of their interrogation. Further, it would be incredible that a prosecu- 
tor's closing summation to the jury would not contain language and 
arguments carefully selected and deliberately formulated to have a dev- 
astating impact on the jury. Prosecutors know that they are more likely 
to win a conviction when they present a powerful and dramatic argu- 
ment to the jury than when they present a more restrained 
argument.233 
Prosecutors are well aware of the impact of inadmissible evidence 
on a jury, and they realize that they are more likely to benefit than lose 
from using inadmissible proof. One study conducted at the University 
of Washington tested the effects of inadmissible evidence on the deci- 
sions of jurors, and found that the impact of the inadmissible evidence 
was inversely related to the strength of the prosecutor's case.234 Thus, 
when the prosecutor presented a weak case, the inadmissible evidence 
strongly prejudiced the jury in the prosecutor's favor. In this situation, 
"the controversial evidence becomes quite salient in the juror's 
minds."236 Moreover, as most judges and lawyers are aware, even if the 
evidence is stricken, it nevertheless has an impact, perhaps an uncon- 
231. Judge Jerome Frank's often-quoted dissenting opinion in United States v. Antonelli 
Fireworks, Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946). emphasized that a 
judicial attitude of "helpless piety" in the face of prosecutorial misconduct, and the use of "purely 
ceremonial language" to express disapproval, merely encourages further prosecutorial escesses, 
and also "breeds a deplorably cynical attitude towards the judiciary." 
232. See Goldberg, supra note 206. 
233. Behavioral studies of forensic conduct by prosecutors have made this point. See Saul 
Pyszczynski. The Effects of Opening Statements on Mock Juror's Verdicts in a Sinlulated Critlii- 
naI Trial, 1 l J .  APP. SOC. PSYCH. 301 (1981); Elizabeth Calder, The Relation of Cognitive and 
Memorial Processes to Persuasion in a Simulated Jury Trial, 4 J.  APP SOC. PSYCH 62 (1974). 
234. Richard Sue, The Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Sinr~tlarrd 
Jurors-A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 345 (1973). 
235. Id. at 351. 
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scious one, on the individual juror's judgment.23e The conscious or un- 
conscious effect of stricken testimony or evidence is not lost on a prose- 
cutor in tune with the psychology of the 
Of course, a prosecutor who adopts the unethical norm and im- 
properly introduces inadmissible proof or argument probably recognizes 
the risk of jeopardizing a conviction. When the prosecutor has a weak 
case, however, a subsequent reversal may be worth that risk. "Let's get 
the conviction now, and worry about the appeal later on," is not an 
uncommon attitude among some prosecutors. Thus, if winning convic- 
tions is the raison d'etre of prosecutorial work-and it is with many 
prosecutors-then the harmless error rule plays right into the prosecu- 
tor's hands. The prosecutor with a strong case will not be deterred from 
engaging in misconduct because even if his conduct is criticized by an 
appellate court, the conviction still will be affirmed. Similarly, the pros- 
ecutor with a weak case will feel that he has nothing to lose and every- 
thing to gain by engaging in unethical behavior. 
Harmless error review undoubtedly preserves convictions and saves 
judicial resources. By insulating prosecutors from serious misconduct, 
however, harmless error review encourages a "winning is everything" 
attitude with fairness being a mere afterthought. Accordingly, many 
defendants have had their convictions affirmed despite clear 
prosecutorial overreaching. 
2. Demise of Supervisory Power 
Whatever judicial constraints over prosecutorial excesses that ex- 
isted under the so-called Supervisory Power Doctrine have largely been 
removed. Nearly fifty years ago, in McNabb v. United States,238 Justice 
236. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (characterizing curative 
instruction as a "fiction") (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 
574 (2d Cir. 1956). rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (characterizing curative instruction as a "judicial 
lie") (Frank, J., dissenting); United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956). afd, 
352 U.S. 232 (1957) (characterizing curative instruction as a "placebo"). 
237. Familiarity with prosecutorial tactics, which often do not differ markedly from tactics 
of trial lawyers generally, suggests that prosecutors frequently ask rhetorical questions knowing 
that the question is improper, but hoping to insinuate to the jury that the question itself conveys a 
fuctu~l basis adverse to the defendant. This practice is explicitly unethical. See ABA STANDARDS 
I U R  CRIMINAL JUSTICE $ 3-5.7(d) (2d ed. 1986) ("It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to 
abk n question which implies the existence of a factual predicate for which a good faith belief is 
lucking"). Of course, negating the prosecutor's claim of the existence of a good faith belief might 
be ditticult. But, quaere, how often do trial judges even put the prosecutor on the spot by demand- 
ing n good faith belief'? 
238. 31s U.S. 332 (1943). 
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Frankfurter wrote that the federal courts have "the duty of establishing 
and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence" that 
are broader in scope than protections afforded by the Constitution or 
statutes.23D The twofold purpose of this supervisory power has been to 
deter governmental misconduct and preserve judicial integrity.240 How- 
ever, this effort to impose "extra-constitutional" standards on govern- 
ment behavior has been short-lived for several reasons. First, it re- 
quired judges to impose on government officials their own notions of 
"good The judiciary has resisted this in~itation.~" Second, 
supervisory power increasingly has been viewed as an unwarranted ju- 
dicial intrusion into the exclusive domain of a coordinate branch of 
government.243 Finally, once supervisory power became subservient to 
the harmless error rule,244 it became largely irrelevant.245 
The Supreme Court has relied on the exercise of supervisory au- 
thority over the administration of criminal justice to promulgate rules 
of procedure and evidence in a variety of criminal settings, several of 
which regulated prosecutorial behavior.246 Lower federal courts fol- 
239. Id. at  340-341. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Crinrinal 
Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM 
L. REV. 1433 (1984). 
240. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-736 n.8 (1980). 
241. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947). 
242. United States v. Russell, 41 1 U.S. 423. 435 (1973) (decisions of lower federal courts 
on law enforcement practices "introduce[] an unmanageably subjective standard"); United States 
v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The supervisory power simply does not give 
the courts the authority to make up the rules as they go, imposing limits on the executive accord- 
ing to whim or will"). 
243. Russell, 41 1 U.S. a t  435 ("the execution of the federal laws under our Constitution is 
confided primarily to the Executive Branch of the Government"); Sitnpson, 927 F.2d at 1091 
("The doctrine of separation of powers requires judicial respect for the independence of the 
prosecutor"). 
244. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 
487 U.S. 250 (1988). 
245. The most recent application of supervisory power by the Supreme Court was Young v. 
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). in which the Court held that 
counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in a 
contempt action alleging a violation of that order. This case dealt with a blatant conflict of inter- 
est by an attorney; it did not address misconduct by prosecutors generally, nor seek to regulate 
any particular instance of prosecutorial conduct. 
246. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) (restriction on impeachment by prosecu- 
tor); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (prosecutor's duty to provide defense with prior 
statements of witness); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. (1957) (prosecutor's duty to disclose 
informant's identity); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) (prosecutor witness who gave 
false testimony "polluted" integrity of trial). 
Heinonline - -  53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 432 1991-1992 
19921 NEW PROSECUTORS 433 
lowed the Supreme Court's lead.247 One of the principal areas in which 
the courts have exercised supervisory power has been in preventing 
prosecutorial abuse of the grand jury's process and authority.248 Admit- 
tedly, the parameters of the supervisory power doctrine are unclear, 
and courts and commentators have disagreed on the underlying ration- 
ale for its use and on the circumstances justifying judicial 
interventi~n.~'~ 
Regardless of whether supervisory power is a legitimate doctrine 
to curb prosecutorial excesses, however, the important point is that 
prosecutors for over forty years recognized it as a limitation on their 
independence. Today, prosecutors can and would be foolish to regard 
supervisory power as a serious threat to their autonomy. The doctrine 
has become an empty shell, liberating prosecutors from a potential 
check on their authority, and serving mostly as a reminder to lower 
federal courts not to usurp the prosecutor's prerogative.250 
The demise of supervisory power can be traced to United States v. 
where the Supreme Court reinstated a drug conviction that 
had been reversed by the court of appeals for excessive governmental 
involvement in the Undercover agents participated in the 
manufacture of illegal drugs by supplying an essential chemical to the 
drug ring. Reproaching lower federal courts for developing a variety of 
extra-constitutional rationales to constrain overzealous law enforcement 
conduct, the Court, in an opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, warned 
the federal judiciary against exercising a "chancellor's foot veto over 
247. See Beale, supra note 239, at 1455-62 (listing cases). 
248. See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Samango. 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979); In 
rt3 Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975); United 
States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972); United Stares v. Shuck, 705 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. 
W. Va. 1989). rev'd, 895 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. 
Supp. 1414 (D.C. Md. 1986). See also Douglas P.  Currier, Note, The Exercise of Supervisory 
Powers to Dismiss a Grand Jury Indictment-A Basis for Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 
OHIO ST L.J 1077 (1984). 
249. Compnre Beale, supra note 239, at 1520-22 (contending that supervisory power lacks 
authority in federal law and term should be abandoned) with Nelson Monaghan, The Supreme 
(burr. 1974 Term-Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 H A R V .  L. REV. 1. 34-38 (1975) 
(contending that supervisory power is an appropriate form of federal common law). 
250. United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1091 (1990) ("[dlismissing an indictment 
with prejudice encroaches on the prosecutor's charging authority, substituting a judicial wag-of- 
the-finger for the prosecutorial nod."). 
251. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
252. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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law enforcement practices of which it did not approve."263 Such judi- 
cial intervention, Justice Rehnquist pointedly commented, "unnecessa- 
rily introduces an unmanageably subjective standard," and violates the 
principle of Separation of Powers.264 Thus, governmental investigative 
conduct would be immune from judicial supervision unless that conduct 
implicates an independent constitutional right, or "is so outrageous that 
due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invok- 
ing judicial processes to obtain a conviction."266 
Even flagrant governmental illegality that actually violates individ- 
ual rights would be exempt from judicial supervision. Thus, in United 
States v. P a ~ n e r , ~ ~ ~  the Court held that the doctrine did not authorize 
a court to suppress evidence that was illegally seized by the police if 
the seizure did not violate the rights of the defendant himself. Known 
as the "briefcase caper," Payner involved an admittedly illegal search 
and seizure by the police of documents found in a third party's brief- 
case that incriminated the defendant. The district court, in invoking the 
supervisory power doctrine, held that society's interest in deterring gov- 
ernment conduct that "knowingly and purposefully" and in "bad faith 
hostility" violated a person's rights required suppression of the result- 
ing evidence.267 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the interests 
of society in deterring illegal conduct and preserving judicial integrity 
should be subordinated to the interest of presenting reliable evidence of 
guilt to the fa~tfinder.~" Payner is more than a body blow to the super- 
visory doctrine; it is a symbolic statement from our highest court that 
253. Russell, 41 1 U.S. a t  435. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at  431-32. The Court's opinion cited Rochin v. California. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) as 
authority for this rule. Rochin is the classic case illustrating the due process limits on law cnforce- 
ment investigative tactics. In Rochin, the Supreme Court determined that the police officers' use 
of a stomach pump to force two capsules of narcotics from the defendant's stomach offended due 
process. The Court, in a famous opinion by Justice Frankfurter, reversed Rochin's conviction in 
the state courts, stating: "This is conduct that shocks the conscience." Id. at 172. In Hampton v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), a majority would allow a due process defense only in extreme 
cases of governmental misconduct. Id. at  494-95 n.6. The concurring opinion of Justice Powell 
referred to Judge Friendly's statement in United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 
1973). that it would be "unthinkable" to permit government, in effect, to join a gang of hoodlums 
and practice violence on innocent citizens, in order to obtain evidence against the gang. 
256. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
257. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 130 (N.D. Ohio 1977). a f d  per curiani. 
590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979). rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
258. Payner, 447 U.S. a t  735 (supervisory power does "not authorize a federal court to 
suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third 
party not before the court"). 
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in certain cases involving law enforcement excesses, the end really does 
justify the means. 
However, the real death-knell of supervisory power over 
prosecutorial misconduct at  trial was struck in United States v. Hast- 
ing.26B The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had reversed kid- 
napping convictions on the ground that the prosecutor's summation in- 
fringed on the defendants' Fifth Amendment privilege in direct 
violation of repeated and explicit warnings by the circuit court against 
such misconduct.2e0 Clearly, the court of appeals sought to vindicate 
the interests that the supervisory power doctrine was explicitly designed 
to address--deterring prosecutorial overreaching and preserving judi- 
cial integrity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that supervisory 
power could not be used to censure prosecutorial misconduct without 
first determining whether the defendant was prejudiced by the con- 
Of course, if the prosecutor's conduct was harmful, there would 
be no need to invoke the supervisory power doctrine, since reversal 
could then be predicated on the prejudicial conduct. 
Finally, the use of supervisory power in the pretrial context to 
sanction the prosecutorial misconduct inside the grand jury was curbed 
in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,262 essentially on the same 
prejudicial error rationale as Hasting. Here again, prejudice to the de- 
fendant was the linchpin; lacking harm, no foul would be found. As 
with harmless error review, the clear message to lower courts is that 
sufficient proof of guilt will insulate almost any amount of prosecutorial 
misconduct from reversal.263 
3. Absence of Meaningful Standards to Guide Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
One of the most disturbing developments in criminal justice over 
the last two decades has been the judiciary's failure to provide clear 
standards that would place some rational limits on the prosecutor's dis- 
cretion. The decisions are increasingly ad hoc, and do not lend them- 
selves to systematic analysis. They appear to allow the exercise of virtu- 
259. 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
260. United States v. Hasting, 660 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1981). 
261. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
262. 487 U.S. 250 (1988). 
263. But see United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1991) and United 
States v. Lopez. 404 U.S. 1213 (1971). for examples of courts breaking the trend and exercising 
their supervisory power. 
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ally unlimited prosecutorial discretion, and drastically curtail the 
ability of defendants to prove the existence of prosecutorial abuses. 
Decisions dealing with the prosecutor's suppression of evidence 
make the point. In Brady v. M a r y l ~ n d , 2 ~ ~  the Supreme Court held, for 
the first time, that due process requires a prosecutor to disclose excul- 
patory evidence to the defense. Describing the prosecutor's duty, the 
Court said, "[slociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but 
when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice 
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."265 
In decisions prior to Brady dealing with the prosecutor's use of 
perjured testim0ny,2~~ and decisions following Brady dealing with a 
prosecutor's failure to disclose specifically requested the 
Court indicated that the prosecutor's culpability in suppressing 
favorable evidence would be counted against the prosecutor in deciding 
on the appropriate remedy.26s Plainly, if some degree of prosecutorial 
bad faith in this distortion of the fact-finding process is considered to 
be relevant, then a ruling imposing more severe sanctions upon prosecu- 
tors for intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence would make 
sense.260 Faced with an opportunity to fashion a rule that might make 
prosecutors more alert to their disclosure obligations, and discourage 
acts of willful misconduct, the Supreme Court retreated. Thus, in 
Smith v. Phillip~,2~O a murder trial, the prosecutor hid from the de- 
fense information that a juror had sought employment with the same 
prosecutor's office. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
granted the habeas corpus petitio11,2~~ but the Supreme Court reversed, 
concluding that there was no proof of actual bias by the juror, nor 
proof that the defendant was prejudiced by the non-disclosure. Writing 
264. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
265. Id. at  87. 
266. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942): Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
267. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972). 
268. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (prosecutor's "deliberate deception . . . 
is inconsistent with rudimentary demands of justice"); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) 
(prosecutor's "knowing [I use [of] false . . . testimony" violates due process); Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (prosecutor should have known about witness's false testimony); 
Agurs. 427 U.S. at  106 (prosecutor's failure to respond to defendant's specific request "seldom, if 
ever. excusable"). 
269. This is not to suggest that a prosecutor's inadvertent nondisclosure of material evidence 
should not result in the imposition of sanctions. Clearly sanctions should be imposed, first, to 
encourage prosecutors to be more vigilant about their discovery obligations, and second, to prevent 
a distortion of the fact-finding process regardless of the prosecutor's dereliction. 
270. 455 U.S. 209 (1982). 
271. Smith v. Phillips, 632 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist observed that the prosecutor's 
unethical conduct could be overlooked because the "touchstone of due 
process analysis is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecu tor."272 
This failure to articulate standards for responsible conduct by 
prosecutors was further demonstrated in United States v. Valenzuela- 
Berna1.273 There, the prosecutor ordered the deportation of illegal-alien 
eyewitnesses to the defendant's crime before they could be interviewed 
by defense counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re- 
versed the conviction, finding that the prosecutor's conduct deprived the 
defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.274 
Again the Supreme Court reversed. The prosecutor's motive in deliber- 
ately ordering the deportation of these witnesses was irrelevant. Ac- 
cording to the Court, the prompt deportation of illegal aliens is an over- 
riding duty of the Executive Branch to which courts must defer absent 
a "plausible showing" that the lost evidence would be favorable and 
material to the defense.276 
The Court also has made it much more difficult to remedy 
prosecutorial disclosure violations by imposing a heavier burden on the 
defense to prove prejudice. In United States v. Agur~,'~' the Court had 
formulated different standards for finding a due process violation de- 
pending on whether or not the evidence was specifically requested by 
the defense. The Court had fashioned a more stringent test against the 
prosecutor when the defense had made a specific request for evidence, 
since in that case the prosecutor was given notice, and it was therefore 
"reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond."277 Indeed, "[wlhen 
272. 455 U.S. at  219 (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). 
273. 458 U.S. 858 (1982). 
274. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 647 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1981). 
275. Valetizuala-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873. Of course, as the dissent pointed out, id. at 883, 
showing the importance of evidence without an opportunity to examine that evidence first can be 
exceedingly difficult. This same difficulty in proving the materiality of lost or destroyed evidence 
was held by the Court in two subsequent decisions to be an insufficient basis on which to impose a 
higher standard on prosecutors. See California v. Trornbetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984); Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 
276. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
277. Id. at 106. Thus. reversible error occurs if the suppressed evidence "might have af- 
fected the outcome of the trial." Id. at 104. According to Justice Stevens, who authored the Agurs 
opinion, suppressed evidence that has been specifically requested is material "if there is 'any rea- 
sonable likelihood' that it could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact." United States v. 
Bagley. 473 U.S. 667. 713 (1985) (dissenting opinion). 
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the prosecutor receives a specific request, the failure to make any re- 
sponse is seldom, if ,ever, excusable."278 
In United States v. Bagley,27D however, the Court jettisoned this 
standard in favor of a single test to cover specific request and non- 
request cases. Under this standard, the prosecutor's willful failure to 
disclose specifically requested information will not be remedied unless 
there is a "reasonable probability" that had the evidence been dis- 
closed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.280 What 
this means in practice is that if the prosecutor hides important evidence 
and a conviction results, reversal will not be ordered unless an appellate 
court can conclude that the trial jury probably would have acquitted 
the defendant had the evidence been disclosed. However, as noted 
above in discussing the harmless error rule, if substantial evidence of 
guilt exists, the prosecutor need not worry about the consequences of 
hiding exculpatory evidence. A court will conclude that it probably 
would not have changed the result.281 If the case is weak, disclosure 
might destroy any chance for a conviction. Moreover, if the prosecutor 
hides the evidence, it might never be discovered. Thus, under the Su- 
preme Court's current disclosure rules, the prosecutor's decision to sup- 
press favorable evidence would be a perfectly rational, albeit unethi- 
~ a 1 , ~ ~ ~  act. 
278. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106. The need for a more stringent standard in specific request 
cases is readily understandable. When a prosecutor fails to respond to a specific request, the de- 
fense is harmed in two distinct ways. First, the defense loses favorable evidence that it would 
otherwise be able to use. Second, the defense strategy is skewed by the assumption, based on the 
prosecutor's response, that such evidence probably does not exist. The prosecutor's nondisclosure 
has thereby distorted the adversary process by depriving the fact-finder of relevant information 
needed to more fully arrive a t  the truth, and has undermined the defendant's right to a fair trial. 
279. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
280. Id. a t  682. This new federal constitutional standard has been rejected by at least one 
state appellate court. In People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1990), the New York Court of 
Appeals, citing the state constitutional due process clause, refused to apply the federal standard 
announced in Bagley and imposed instead the more protective Agurs standard for prosecutorial 
suppression of evidence following a specific request. 
281. Indeed, the courts have construed the standard quite broadly in favor of the prosecu- 
tor. See. e.g., United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1989); Myatt v. United States, 
875 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1989); Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285 (I l th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Tincher, 749 F. Supp. 1494 (S.D. Ohio 1990), vacated, 943 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1991). 
282. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE $ 3-3.1 1 (2d ed. 1982); more reprehensible 
than suppressing favorable evidence is suborning perjury, or falsely representing to the jury that 
certain facts exist. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (prosecutor's subornation of 
perjury to obtain murder conviction); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (prosecutor misrepresents 
to jury in murder case that pair of shorts worn by defendant were stained with victim's blood. 
when prosecutor knew the stains were paint); DeMarco v. United States, 928 F.2d 1074 (I lth 
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Thus, by avoiding any inquiry into the prosecutor's culpability, 
and focusing entirely on the materiality of the evidence, the Court en- 
courages prosecutors, even ethical prosecutors, to withhold evidence.283 
It is not an understatement to say that prosecutorial suppression of evi- 
dence presents perhaps one of the principal threats to a system of ra- 
tional and fair fact-finding. It skews the ability of the adversary process 
to function properly by denying important evidence to the defense. As a 
result, countless defendants have been unjustly convicted, with the con- 
sequent loss of their liberty, and even their lives.284 Many of the Su- 
preme Court's landmark decisions dealing with prosecutorial suppres- 
sion of evidence involved defendants facing execution.286 Recently, a 
series of sensational accounts in the media dramatized this pernicious 
Indeed, just a few months ago, a defendant on death row 
was executed, despite convincing proof that the prosecutor suppressed 
crucial evidence relating to the credibility of the government's key 
witness.287 
The absence of any blameworthiness requirement in the disclosure 
context is also the rule for trial misconduct generally.288 The prosecu- 
Cir. 1991) (prosecutor suborned perjury); Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d 101 1 (9th Cir. 1991) (prose- 
cutor in murder case falsely insinuates that deceased was robbed when prosecutor knew that his 
property had been retrieved by relatives a t  the hospital); United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426 
(8th Cir. 1991) (suppression of discoverable evidence was reversible error); In re Carpenter, 808 
P.2d 1341 (Kan. 1991) (prosecutor disciplined for misleading jury on basis of false evidence). 
283. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550 
(1987) (concluding that disclosure violations may be committed by highly ethical prosecutors who 
are systemically incapable of observing their disclosure obligations). 
284. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet. Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 STAN L REV. 21 (1987) (article documents that 350 innocent persons were 
convicted of capital murders, that 23 of those persons were executed, with 22 narrowly winning 
reprieves. and that a significant number of these cases involved claims of prosecutorial suppression 
of evidence). See also in/ro notes 190-99 and accompanying text. 
285. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Brady v. 
hlaryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957). 
286. See injia notes 346-55 and accompanying text. 
287. McKleskey v. Zant. 1 1  I S. Ct. 1454 (1991). The Court found that Warren McKleskey 
had "abused" the writ of habeas corpus by failing to raise his claim in an earlier petition, and that 
therefore the federal circuit court was correct in refusing to entertain the claim. It should be noted 
that the district court affirmatively found that the government covertly planted an informant in 
McKleskcy's jail cell for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements from him, and then 
misled McKleskey and his lawyer about the role of that informant. This informant was the crucial 
witness at trial to prove that McKleskey was the triggerman in the murder. The jury that sen- 
tenced McKleskey to die did not know of the informant's role as a government-planted spy. Id. a t  
1486-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
288. McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 40 (D.C. App. 1991) ("[Flrom our standpoint 
the prosecutor's motive is essentially irrelevant. What matters instead is the effect of the disputed 
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tor's motive to unfairly prejudice.a defendant ordinarily is not relevant. 
In some situations, however, it may be legally relevant, but almost im- 
possible to prove. For example, prosecutorial misconduct that triggers a 
mistrial, when committed by the prosecutor with a deliberate "bad 
faith" purpose to unfairly prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial, 
should be sufficient to allow the defendant to invoke double jeopardy to 
bar retrial.289 In Oregon v. Kennedy,290 however, the Supreme Court 
adopted the strictest conceivable test to allow a defendant to success- 
fully invoke double jeopardy as a bar to retrial on grounds of 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
According to the Court, the test is whether the prosecutor's mis- 
conduct was "intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mis- 
The defendant has the burden of proving such a prosecutorial 
mens rea. Short of an outright admission by the prosecutor that his 
conscious purpose was to provoke a mistrial, however, the prosecutor's 
motive would be almost impossible to prove.292 Under the Kennedy 
standard, a prosecutor with a weak or damaged case is encouraged to 
commit prejudicial conduct. If he gets away with it, he has a better 
chance of winning. If the defendant objects, and succeeds in obtaining 
a mistrial, the prosecutor will be able to retry the defendant with a 
better-prepared case unless the defendant is able to prove that the pros- 
ecutor committed the misconduct with the purpose of securing a 
mistrial. 
Even decisions that superficially have restricted the prosecutor's 
autonomy are enforced in a manner that neutralizes, or totally eviscer- 
comment on the verdict."). 
289. That the defendant has a "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal" is undisputed. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). When a prosecutor engages 
in misconduct that taints the jury, the defendant faces a " 'Hobson's choice' between giving up his 
first jury and continuing a trial tainted by prejudicial judicial or prosecutorial error." United 
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976). If a defendant believes that he must sacrifice his 
chosen jury because it has been irreparably tainted by "bad faith" prosecutorial misconduct, 
double jeopardy protects the defendant against being forced to stand trial again and thereby "af- 
ford[ing] the prosecut[or] a more favorable opportunity to convict." Id. a t  61 1 (quoting Donovan 
v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963)). 
290. 456 U.S. 667 (1982). 
291. Id. at  676. 
292. Id. at  688 (Stevens, J., concurring). According to Justice Stevens, it should be suffi- 
cient for double jeopardy purposes that egregious prosecutorial misconduct rendered unmeaningful 
the defendant's choice to continue or terminate the proceedings. Moreover, it would be almost 
impossible to show that the prosecutor specifically intended to provoke a mistrial, rather than 
trying to prejudice the defendant and thereby gain a better chance for a conviction. 
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ates, that restriction. Thus, in Batson v. the Supreme 
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor 
from using peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified jurors 
solely by reason of their race. The defendant, however, bears the bur- 
den of proving purposeful d i sc r imina t i~n .~~~  To avoid sanctions, the 
prosecutor must articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking those 
jurors after the defendant has made out a prima facie showing that the 
prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges on the basis of race. In 
practice, though, prosecutors are becoming increasingly adept at articu- 
lating race-neutral reasons that often appear to be pretextual, but are 
commonly accepted by the courts. Thus, in Hernandez v. New Y ~ r k , ~ ~ ~  
the prosecutor explained that he struck several Hispanic jurors because 
he was "very uncertain that they would be able to listen and follow the 
interpreter."296 Even though the prosecutor made no effort to properly 
challenge these jurors for cause, the trial judge credited the prosecu- 
tor's sincerity. As the Supreme Court noted, courts should give "great 
deference" to findings of prosecutorial ~redibility.~~' 
The judiciary's unwillingness to set meaningful limits on the prose- 
cutor's charging discretion is the principal reason for the prosecutor's 
dominance over the criminal justice system. Doctrines that purport to 
set limits are increasingly avoided or subverted. For example, the doc- 
trine of selective prosecution requires a prosecutor to charge in a non- 
discriminatory fashion.296 However, there is a presumption that the 
prosecutor acts in good faith,29e and overcoming that presumption is 
almost never successful. 
In Wayte v. United States,300 the Supreme Court upheld the pros- 
ecutor's decision to charge the defendant with failing to register for the 
draft.301 The defendant was one of a handful of vocal draft protesters 
293. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
294. Id. at 96-98. The issue whether Batson applies to the exercise of peremptory challenges 
by the defense is gaining increasing attention. See People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y. 1990) 
(holding that Batson applies to exercise of peremptory challenges by defense). The Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari to decide whether the Constitution forbids a defendant from exercis- 
ing peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 
370 (1991). 
295. I 1  1 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
296, Id. at 1864-65. 
297. Id. at 1869. 
298, Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1866). 
299. United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1135 (1st Cir. 1981). 
300. 470 U.S. 598 (1985). 
301. Prior to Wayte, the leading case of selective prosecution in the draft context was 
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who were prosecuted, out of nearly a million non-vocal non-registrants 
who were not prosecuted. Wayte made a colorable showing that he was 
impermissibly targeted for prosecution based on his exercise of first 
amendment rights. He sought discovery of information in the prosecu- 
tor's files to support his claim of improper prosecutorial motivation. 
When the prosecutor resisted, the district judge dismissed the 
indictment.302 
Instead of deciding the discovery issue, the Supreme Court ad- 
dressed the showing that a defendant must make to prove selective 
prosecution. According to the Court, a defendant must show that the 
prosecutor harbored a motive to discriminate against him "because of 
his protest activities."303 However, discovering that motive would be al- 
most impossible because, as the Court observed, the issue of the prose- 
cutor's motive was "ill-suited to judicial review" given the presumption 
of prosecutorial good faith, the prosecutor's recognized expertise in law 
enforcement, and the prosecutor's goals and priorities.304 Moreover, the 
defendant would not be allowed to inspect the prosecutor's files to help 
prove the motive. 
Similarly, prosecutors are not allowed to vindictively charge, i.e., 
to retaliate against a defendant by increasing the charges after the de- 
fendant has exercised constitutional or statutory rights.306 Here again, 
however, a doctrine that potentially could limit improper prosecutorial 
charging practices has been eroded. Thus, in cases arising in almost 
every conceivable procedural context where a prosecutor has increased 
charges after a defendant has exercised certain rights, the courts al- 
most always defer to the prosecutor's discretion.306 This pattern of judi- 
cial permissiveness also is exemplified in plea bargaining,307 immu- 
United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc). 
302. Wayte v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
303. Wayre. 470 U.S. at 610 (emphasis in original). 
304. Id. at 607. 
305. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). The Court had previously ruled that due 
process protected a defendant against vindictiveness by a judge who imposes a harsher sentence 
after a defendant has successfully exercised a constitutional or statutory right. North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 71 1 (1969). 
306. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) (permissible vindictiveness in plea 
bargaining context); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (same); United States v. Lizza 
Industries, Inc., 775 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986) (no vindictive- 
ness in adding charges after mistrial due to hung jury); United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360 
(5th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cerr. denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984) (increasing charges after successful 
appeal not vindictive). 
307. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984) (prosecutor allowed to withdraw plea offer 
after acceptance but before execution of plea); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) 
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n i t ~ , ~ O ~  and dismissal decisions.309 As the Court observed, "The Due 
Process Clause is not a code of ethics for prosecutors."310 The discus- 
sion that follows shows that even the code of ethics may not be the code 
of ethics for prosecutors. 
C. Exemption from Ethical Restraints 
Ethical codes attempt to regulate many areas of prosecutorial be- 
havior. Principal among them are the prosecutor's investigative311 and 
charging functions,312 disclosure of evidence,313 plea discussions,314 trial 
(prosecutor allowed to use threat of death penalty to induce defendant to plead guilty to lesser 
degree of murder): Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985). cerr. denied, 475 U.S. 
104s ( 1986) (prosecutor not required to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendant during plea 
negotiations); United States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (prosecutor allowed to treat 
codefendants differently in making plea offers). 
308. Ricketts v. Adamson. 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (defendant's breach of plea agreement 
removes immunity protection): United States v. Mandujano. 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (constitution- 
ally-required immunity does not prohibit prosecutor from charging defendant with crimes covered 
by immunity grant): Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (same). 
309. Town of Newton v. Rumery. 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (prosecutor allowed to demand that 
defendant release officials from civil liability in exchange for dismissal of charges). 
3 10. Johnson. 467 U.S. at 5 1 1. 
31 1.  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE $ 3-3.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1986). 
312. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1980) (prosecutor 
shall not institute criminal charges when he knows that the charges are "not supported by proba- 
ble cause"); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS $ 9.4(A) (Nat'l Dist. Attorney's Assoc. 1977) 
(prosecutor "shall file only those charges which he believes can reasonably be substantiated by 
admissible evidence a t  trial."). 
The ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE $ 3-3.9 (2d ed. Supp. 1986) contain the follow- 
ing provisions regarding the prosecutor's discretion to charge: 
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute, or cause to be instituted, or to 
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when it is known that the charges are 
not supported by probable cause. A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, 
or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissi- 
ble evidence to support a conviction. 
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support. 
The prosecutor may in some circumstances, and for good cause consistent with the public 
interest, decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which 
would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly 
considcr in exercising his or her discretion are: 
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty: 
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense; 
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular 
olTensc or the offender; 
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant; 
( v )  reluctance of the victim to testify; 
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others; and 
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction. 
(c) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to the per- 
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trial publicity,316 and conflicts of interest.317 Ethical codes 
also mandate prosecutors to "seek justice."318 The prosecutor's viola- 
tion of an ethical rule can result in disciplinary action and the imposi- 
tion of sanctions. Nevertheless, despite public and professional aware- 
ness of the existence of prosecutorial conduct that often violates ethical 
rules,319 there has been for some time a sense of frustration at the fail- 
ure of professional disciplinary organizations to deal with such 
misconduct.320 
sonal or political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or to a desire to 
enhance his or her record of convictions. 
(d) In cases which involve a serious threat to the community, the prosecutor should not be 
deterred from prosecution by the fact that in the jurisdiction juries have tended to acquit 
persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in question. 
(e) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree than can 
reasonably be supported with evidence at trial. 
313. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 3-3.1 1 (2d ed. Supp. 1986) ("unprofes- 
sional conduct for a prosecutor intentionally to fail to make disclosure to the defense, at the earli- 
est feasible opportunity, of the existence of evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused 
as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused"). 
314. Id. $8 3-4.1. 3-4.2 (2d ed. Supp. 1986). 
315. Id. 33 3-5.6 (presentation of evidence), 3-5.7 (examination of witnesses), 3-5.8 (argu- 
ment to the jury), 3-5.9 (facts outside the record) (2d ed. Supp. 1986). 
316. Id. 3-1.3 (2d ed. Supp. 1986). See MONROE H. FREEDMAN. UNDERSTANDING LAW- 
YERS' ETHICS 228-36 (1990). 
317. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 3-1.2 (2d ed. Supp. 1986); FREEDMAN. 
supra note 316, at  223-24. See also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 
787, 809 (1987) (holding that attorney who represented a party's interest in underlying civil mat- 
ter cannot discharge duties impartially as private prosecutor on behalf of private party). 
318. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) (prosecutors must 
"seek justice"); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 3-l.l(c) (2d ed. Supp. 1986) ("The 
duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."). For a critical examination of the 
application in the trial context of the ethical rules mandating that prosecutors must seek justice, 
see Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring The Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors 
Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991). 
319. ROSCOE POUND. CRIMINAL JUSTICE I N  AMERICA 187 (1930) ("The number of new 
trials for grave misconduct of the public prosecutor which may be found in the reports throughout 
the land in the past two decades is significant"); Alschuler, supra note 205; Richard G. Singer, 
Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-And How it Grew, 20 ALA L. REV. 227 (1968); 
Martin Hobbs. Prosecutor's Bias, an Occupational Disease, 2 ALA. L. REV. 40 (1949); John H. 
King. Jr.. Note. Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Limitations Upon the Prosecutor's Role as an 
Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. I095 (1980); Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic 
Misconducr in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946 (1954). Surprisingly, 
there exists no record-keeping by any agency to document cases of professional discipline against 
prosecutors. See letter from John Jay Douglas, Dean of the National College of District Attor- 
neys, dated October 3, 1989, to the writer (copy of letter enclosed). 
320. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for "Brady" Viola- 
tions: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987); Alschuler, supra note 205, at 670-73; Walter 
W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965 (1984); Jerry E. 
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Documenting the failure of bar grievance committees to invoke 
disciplinary sanctions against prosecutors is not difficult. There is an 
astonishing absence from appellate court decisions or reports by disci- 
pline groups of cases dealing with misconduct by prosecutors. For ex- 
ample, despite the recognized frequency of misconduct by prosecutors 
in argument to the this writer has found only one decision in- 
volving a disciplinary proceeding against a prosecutor for such con- 
This failure to discipline prosecutors contrasts sharply with the 
fairly common use of disciplinary sanctions against private attorneys in 
civil and criminal matters.323 
There are practical and institutional reasons for this default by 
disciplinary bodies. Professional discipline rules were drafted, have de- 
veloped, and are presently used to regulate the private attorney-client 
relationship. Grievance committees are accustomed to disciplining the 
private bar. The prosecutor does not have a private client and, as a 
public figure, is outside the ambit of many of the ethical rules that 
regulate attorney-client behavior. Moreover, as a governmental figure 
of enormous power and prestige, the prosecutor is a person who profes- 
sional bar organizations would not wish to alienate. Bar associations 
also are aware that in today's anti-crime climate, the prosecutor is en- 
couraged to be zealous, and bar groups do not want to be seen as chil- 
ling this prosecutorial zeal. Further, the standards regulating 
prosecutorial behavior-i.e., to "seek justicev-are often so nebulous as 
to be ~ n e n f o r c e a b l e , ~ ~ ~  which merely reinforces the institutional reluc- 
tance to enforce the rules in the first place. Finally, with limited re- 
sources, grievance committees find that it is simpler and less costly to 
institute disciplinary proceedings against a private lawyer for a garden 
Norton. Governnient Attorneys' Ethics in Transirion. 72 JUDICATURE 299 (1989); Greg Rushford. 
U'cltcl~ing the Watchdog. LEGAL TIMES OF WASH, Feb. 5, 1990, at  1, 18. See also United States 
v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 522 (1983) ("Prior experience, for example, might have demonstrated 
the rutility of relying on Department of Justice disciplinary proceedings.") (Brennan, J., concur- 
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
321. See generally supra note 226. 
322. 1t1 rhe Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 2 MASS. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE RE- 
IWRTS 110 (1980) (prosecutor privately admonished but not identified by name). Informal disci- 
plinc through private admonitions, as in the above case, may be somewhat helpful in upgrading 
ethics. A private admonition against a prosecutor becomes a matter of record. See Hal R. Lieber- 
man, ltflirt~lal Discipline: Tool to Upgrade Ethics, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 22, 1991, at 1. 
323. See United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433. 1437 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1991)-(docu- 
menting the steady increase in attorney discipline proceedings). 
324. See Zacharias. supra note 318. at  46-50. 
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variety violation, such as the theft of escrow funds, than against a pros- 
ecutor for the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. 
Prosecutors are well aware that professional discipline is lax. This 
awareness accounts for the extreme positions taken by some prosecu- 
tors recently, particularly the former Attorney General of the United 
States, who argued that federal prosecutors should be exempt from eth- 
ical restraints imposed by local bar associations, and should be subject 
only to federal discipline imposed by the Justice Department's Office of 
Professional Resp~nsibility.~~Vndeed, the Attorney General's argu- 
ment was recently articulated by a federal prosecutor in West Virginia, 
who, in Kolibash v. Committee on Legal S U C C ~ S S ~ U ~ ~ ~  avoided 
disciplinary proceedings by the State Bar Association by having the 
proceeding removed to federal court. The Attorney General's argument 
that federal prosecutors are exempt from ethical rules dealing with 
lawyer contacts with a represented party has provoked considerable 
One commentator has argued that the ethical rule was not in- 
tended to apply to prosecutors, and that its intended scope is limited 
"entirely [to the] civil arena."328 According to this commentator, even 
if the rule is applied to prosecutors, the most accurate construction of 
the "authorized by law" language is that prosecutors are exempt from 
the restriction. Several courts have taken a different view. In United 
States v. Hammad,32B the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
325. The Office of Professional Responsibility traditionally has been lax in investigating 
complaints against government attorneys. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499. 522 (1983) 
("futility of relying on the Department of Justice disciplinary proceedings") (Brennan, J., concur- 
ring in part and dissenting in part). A Congressional Committee discovered that no disciplinary 
action had been taken against ten prosecutors found by federal courts to have engaged in miscon- 
duct. See H.R. REP. NO. 986, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1990). The Committee observed: 
[Rlepeated findings of no misconduct, and the Department's failure to explain its disagree- 
ments with findings of misconduct by the Courts raises serious questions regarding what 
the Department considers "prosecutorial misconduct . . . within the meaning of either the 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY of the Standards of Conduct in the De- 
partment of Justice." 
Id. at  25. 
See also Greg Rushford, No Action Has Been Taken, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Jan. 28, 1991. 
a t  1; Rushford, supra note 320, a t  1. 
326. 872 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1989). 
327. Norton, supra note 320; Federal Prosecutorial Authority in a Changing Legal Envi- 
ronment: More Attention Required, Thirty-third Report by the Committee on Government Oper- 
ations, H.R. REP. NO. 986, IOlst Cong., 2d. Sess. 32 (1990). 
328. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence From the Mind of the Crintinal Suspect: A Reconsidera- 
tion of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLULI. L. REV. 1 137, 1 176-83 ( 1987). 
329. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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that the ethical rule applies to prosecutors in pre-indictment as well as 
post-indictment settings, and that judicial sanctions, such as suppres- 
sion of evidence, could be applied for violations. Other courts, while 
agreeing that the rule applies to prosecutors, would apply it only in the 
post-indictment context.330 
There can be little question that legitimate investigations might be 
impeded by an unqualified application of the ethical rule. This conflict 
was highlighted by a recent decision of a district court in Califor- 
nia-United States v. Lope~~~~-which  dismissed an indictment for vi- 
olation by the prosecutor of the ethical rule. In Lopez, the defendant, 
together with two others, was indicted for various narcotics violations. 
Lopez obtained a lawyer who made it very clear to Lopez that he 
would defend the case aggressively, but that his policy was not to make 
a deal with prosecutors regarding his client's cooperation. Lopez, fear- 
ing for his welfare and that of his family, became ambivalent. Desiring 
to protect himself and his family, he authorized his co-defendant's law- 
yer to see if a deal could be arranged. Relying on the Attorney Gen- 
eral's Memorandum, the prosecutor spoke to Lopez several times 
outside the presence of his lawyer, and eventually brought into the case 
a federal magistrate for the purpose of ascertaining whether Lopez had 
effectively waived his right to counsel. Throughout the proceedings, the 
federal prosecutor and the magistrate assumed that a third party was 
paying the fee of Lopez's attorney. After plea negotiations fell apart, 
Lopez's lawyer learned of the secret communications and moved to dis- 
miss the indictment based on a violation of his client's Sixth Amend- 
ment right to counsel, and the government's violation of the ethical 
rule. The district judge, "convinced that no remedy short of dismissal 
will have any significant deterrent effect on future government miscon- 
duct of the type found in this case,"332 dismissed the indictment in the 
exercise of her supervisory power. The court found that no Sixth 
Amendment violation occurred, but that a violation of the ethical rule 
did take place, mandating dismissal. 
The district judge's decision to invoke the extreme sanction of dis- 
missal was unusual. As noted above,333 the Supreme Court has ren- 
dered the supervisory power doctrine a virtual nullity, particularly 
when no prejudice is shown, as was the case in Lopez. Moreover, the 
330. United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 1  1 S. Ct. 152 (1990). 
331. 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
332. Id. at 1464. 
333. See supra notes 237-61 and accompanying test. 
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government's decision to include the federal magistrate in the discus- 
sions with Lopez may have removed any taint. Finally, Lopez's desire, 
in effect, to have his cake and eat it too, while not a controlling factor, 
may be relevant in deciding whether Lopez had validly waived his right 
to counsel, thereby permitting the prosecutor's otherwise unauthorized 
communication. 
However, it is not so much the merits of this particular case that is 
most troubling. Clearly of greatest concern to the district judge was the 
Attorney General's assertion that the Supremacy Clause justifies the 
government's arrogation of the power to investigate crime without any 
ethical accountability. As the district court correctly observed, "the ti- 
tle U.S. Attorney does not give the prosecutor a hunting license exempt 
from ethical constraints of advocacy."334 
The Attorney General's Memorandum, together with the Kolibash 
case, may foreshadow further attempts by federal prosecutors to try to 
insulate themselves from state ethical rules. Paralleling this develop- 
ment, and equally disturbing, is an indication that state prosecutors 
may be attempting to emulate the Attorney General's position, and ar- 
guing that the doctrine of Separation of Powers prevents state bar as- 
sociations from interfering with the prosecutorial authority of the exec- 
utive branch of state government.336 This attitude reflects an arrogance 
of power that can ultimately undermine the public's faith in this impor- 
tant institution. 
In sum, the American prosecutor, owing to a variety of social and 
political factors, has emerged as the most pervasive and dominant force 
in criminal justice. The prosecutor's substantive and procedural powers 
continue to expand, while the courts increasingly defer to the prosecu- 
tor's decisions. Given the absence of meaningful legal and ethical con- 
straints on the prosecutor's abuse of power, the inherent inequality be- 
tween the government and the accused has become magnified. As a 
consequence, interests of justice and fairness are regulated, and de- 
fined, not by formal and impartial mechanisms such as judges and ju- 
ries, but by prosecutorial prerogatives and power. 
11. RESTORING THE BALANCE OF POWER 
From an examination of the new prerogatives of prosecutors, and 
334. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1463 (quoting United States v. Beckett, 706 F.2d 519, 521 n.5 
(5th Cir. 1983)). 
335. In re Criminal Investigation No. 13, 573 A.2d 51 (Md. 1990); Triple A. Machinc 
Shop Inc. v. State. 213 Cal. App. 3d 131 (1989). See also Norton, supra note 320, at 207. 
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the lack of meaningful judicial or ethical oversight to temper 
prosecutorial zeal, one can understand why this may be the "Age of the 
P r o s e c ~ t o r . " ~ ~ ~  The goal of attempting to restore equilibrium to the 
criminal justice system has been elusive and vexing. This article does 
not presume to offer simple or simplistic solutions. The following pro- 
posals are suggested to invite further discussion. These proposals would 
allow prosecutors to prosecute crime aggressively, while at the same 
time preserving the ability of defendants to defend themselves effec- 
tively. These proposals seek to reform outmoded and unfair criminal 
discovery laws, create an independent disciplinary body to investigate 
and impose sanctions for ethical violations by prosecutors, and suggest 
a model for prosecution and defense work that would allow some cross- 
fertilization between roles, and thereby make prosecutors more sensi- 
tive to the qualities that make a good prosecutor. 
A. Expanded Discovery 
The most formidable threat to rationality and fairness in the ad- 
versarial system comes not from restrictions on the exclusionary rule, 
or the erosion of due process constraints on prosecutorial excesses, but 
from the prosecutor's institutional role in controlling access to informa- 
tion relevant to a defendant's guilt, and the prosecutor's ability to with- 
hold evidence that might prove a defendant's innocence. It is this power 
that most dramatically distorts the ability of the adversary system to 
function fairly and properly.337 
The prosecutor acquires relevant information in a variety of 
By contrast, the defense attorney has no access to most of the 
prosecutor's data-gathering machinery. For example, the prosecutor at 
the earliest stages of a case can obtain police reports of investigative 
work, interviews of witnesses, scientific tests, and other field work; can 
force witnesses to appear before the grand jury and testify; can sub- 
poena all documents and records relevant to the case; can acquire tan- 
gible and verbal evidence from court-ordered searches and electronic 
eavesdropping; and can obtain from well-staffed and experienced crime 
laboratories a variety of forensic proof. 
The defendant's ability to acquire relevant information about the 
case is extremely limited. The defendant usually confronts the prosecu- 
336. See Fisher. supra note 74, at 261 11.263. 
337. Set. supra notes 262-86 and accompanying text. 
338. YALE KALIISAR. ET AL.. MODERN C R I ~ I I N A L  PROCEDURE 1127-31 (7th ed. 1990). 
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tion forces not only with meager resources, but also under statutory330 
and doctrinal rules340 that restrict his ability to gather meaningful in- 
formation about the case. Given these inequalities, it is not surprising 
that the adversary system, in Justice Brennan's familiar metaphor, is 
more like a sporting event than a quest for 
Discovery in American litigation has never favored criminal de- 
fendants. Well into the early 1900s, pretrial discovery was largely non- 
existent. Informal exchanges of information, or incidental discovery 
through preliminary proceedings, were the principal means of disclo- 
During the 1930s and 1940s, legislation and court rules dra- 
matically altered pretrial discovery in civil cases. Through depositions, 
interrogatories, and the compulsory production of tangible items, each 
party gained access to virtually all relevant information possessed by 
the other side. Accompanying this expansionist trend in civil cases was 
a concomitant push in the 1950s and 1960s for broader pretrial discov- 
ery in criminal cases. Proponents of broader discovery argued that a 
trial should be a search for the truth, rather than a game of "blind 
man's and that the truth is more likely to emerge when each 
side is equipped with all relevant information about the case. Moreover, 
expanded discovery was believed necessary to offset the substantial ad- 
vantages possessed by the prosecution in its investigation of crime, and 
the substantial disadvantages facing defense counsel who, from a re- 
source standpoint alone, lacked the ability to obtain inf~rmation.~" 
Opponents of expanded discovery argued that it would facilitate 
perjured testimony, would lead to bribery and the intimidation of wit- 
nesses, and because the privilege against self-incrimination protected 
defendants from reciprocal discovery, would be a one-way street favor- 
ing the accused. The opponent's position was best summed up by Chief 
Judge Arthur Vanderbilt, who said in State v. Tune346 that 
339. See. e . g . , ' ~ ~ ~ .  R. CRIM. P. 16: N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Law art. 240 (McKinney 1989). 
340. See Bennett Gershman, The Right to Evidence, N.Y. STATE BAR JOURNAL NOV. 1989 
at 52; Bennett Gershman, The Prosecutor2 Obligation to Grant Defense Witness Immunity, 24 
CRIM. L. BULL. 4 (1988). 
341. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for 
Truth?. 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279. 
342. See KAMISAR. supra note 338, at 1127. See also Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and 
Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228 (1964). 
343. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). 
344. For a helpful discussion of the effect of broad pretrial criminal discovery in one of the 
few states that allows pretrial criminal depositions, see John F. Yetter, Discovery Depositions in 
Florida Criminal Proceedings: Should They Survive?, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 675 (1988). 
345. 98 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1953). For a more contemporary rationale for limited defense 
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long experience in criminal cases has taught that . . . the criminal defendant who 
is informed of the names of all the state witnesses may take steps to bribe or 
frighten them into giving perjured testimony or into absenting themselves so they 
are unavailable to testify. Moreover, many witnesses, if they know that the de- 
fendant will have knowledge of their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to 
come forward with information during the investigation of the crime. 
That there exists a close nexus between limited discovery in crimi- 
nal cases and enhanced opportunities for prosecutorial suppression of 
evidence is self-evident. The power to control evidence is the power to 
conceal it. This can result in the conviction and punishment of innocent 
persons. Consider the following cases. 
1. Randall Dale Adams 
Adams was convicted in Texas in 1977 of murdering a police- 
man.34s He was sentenced to die largely on the testimony of a juvenile 
with a lengthy criminal record who made a secret deal with the prose- 
cutor to implicate ad am^,^^? and the testimony of two purported eye- 
witnesses to the killing. The juvenile actually murdered the policeman, 
as he later admitted. At Adams' trial, however, the prosecutor sup- 
pressed information about the secret deal, and successfully kept from 
the jury the juvenile's lengthy criminal record. The prosecutor also 
withheld from Adams' attorney proof that the two eyewitnesses had 
failed to identify Adams in a lineup, and even solicited from these wit- 
nesses testimony that they had made a positive identification of Adams. 
A Texas court recently freed ad am^.^" The court found that the prose- 
cutor "knowingly used perjured testimony and knowingly suppressed 
evidence."340 
2. James Richardson 
Richardson was condemned to die in Florida for poisoning his chil- 
dren in 1967.360 The prosecutor argued that Richardson, a penniless 
discovery by a federal prosecutor, see Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., The Discovery Process in Crinti- 
rtal Pro.recutiorts: Tonlard Fair Trials and Just Verdicts, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 63 (1990). 
346. Adams' case was documented in the recent film by Errol Morris, THE THIN BLUE LINE 
(Miramax Films 1988). 
347. Harris received complete immunity for testifying. Harris acknowledged that the prose- 
cutor told him not to disclose the deal to anyone, even if asked. Bennett Gershman, The Thin Blue 
Line: Art or Trial in the Fact-Finding Process, 9 PACE L. REV. 257, 308 (1989). 
348. E.Y Parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). 
349. Id. at 291-93. 
350. Richardson's case was memorialized in Mark Lane's book. ARCAD~A (1970). 
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farm worker, killed his children to collect insurance. A state judge re- 
cently overturned the murder conviction, finding that the prosecutor 
had suppressed evidence that would have shown Richardson's inno- 
~ e n c e . ~ ~ '  The undisclosed evidence included a sworn statement from the 
children's babysitter that she had killed the youngsters, a sworn state- 
ment from a cellmate of Richardson's that he had been beaten by a 
sheriffs deputy into fabricating a story implicating Richardson, state- 
ments from other inmates contradicting their claims that Richardson 
had confessed to them, and proof that Richardson had never purchased 
any insurance. 
3. James "Shabaka" Brown 
Brown's murder conviction recently was reversed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Brown was hours away from being 
executed; he was measured for his burial suit and asked to order his 
last The federal court found that the prosecutor "knowingly 
allowed material false testimony to be introduced at trial, failed to step 
forward and make the falsity known, and knowingly exploited the false 
testimony in its closing argument to the The subornation of 
perjury related to the testimony of a key prosecution witness who 
falsely denied that a deal had been made with the prosecutor, and the 
prosecutor's misrepresentation of that fact to the trial court. In addi- 
tion, the prosecutor misrepresented to the jury that ballistics evidence 
proved the defendant's guilt, when in fact the prosecutor knew that the 
ballistics report showed that the bullet that killed the deceased could 
not have been fired from the defendant's weapon. 
4. Eric Jackson 
Jackson's murder conviction was recently vacated by a New York 
state Jackson was convicted of starting a fire in a Brooklyn 
supermarket that resulted in the death of six firefighters. If New York 
had a death penalty at the time, Jackson might have been sentenced to 
death. The court found that the prosecutor concealed evidence that 
35 1 .  Convict Freed in Child Poisoning Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1989, at A 19. 
352. Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (I lth Cir. 1986). 
353. This dramatic description of Brown's last hours was captured by the novelist William 
Styron in Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1987, at A25. 
354. Wainwright, 785 F.2d at 1458. 
355. People v. Jackson, 538 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). See Leonard Bucler. Con- 
vicr Freed in Store Blaze thar Killed 6,  N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 4, 1988, at Bi. 
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would have shown that the fire was not arson-related, but was caused 
by an electrical malfunction. During a recent court hearing, the prose- 
cutor consistently maintained that nothing had been suppressed. When 
the judge ordered the prosecutor's file to be submitted to him for his 
inspection, he found two internal memoranda from the trial prosecutor 
to an executive attorney in the prosecutor's office. 'The memoranda 
stated that an expert witness who had examined the evidence concluded 
that the fire had not been deliberately set, and that the expert's conclu- 
sion presented a major problem for the prosecution. None of this infor- 
mation was ever revealed to Jackson's lawyer. 
These cases are indeed shocking, but they are neither unique nor 
aberrational. They represent a recurring and largely unsolved problem 
in American criminal litigation. An exhaustive article in the Stanford 
Law Review in 1987 concluded that an innocent person was convicted 
in 350 capital cases, and that 23 of those condemned were executed, 
with 21 narrowly winning reprieves.366 A significant number of those 
cases involved claims of prosecutorial suppression of evidence. Neither 
the judiciary nor disciplinary bodies have been able to prevent the re- 
currence of this conduct. Discovery reform might be able to address the 
problem from a different perspective. By expanding defense access to 
information, broadened pretrial discovery might dramatically alter both 
the opportunity and the potential for prosecutorial withholding of evi- 
dence. A tentative hypothesis would suggest that disclosure violations 
occur less frequently in the few jurisdictions that permit broad criminal 
than in the jurisdictions that restrict discovery. 
B. Prosecutor Misconduct Commissions 
Prosecutors play a distinctive role in the criminal justice process. 
Their responsibility is not to an individual client but to the cause of 
justice. Accordingly, prosecutors are guided by higher ethical consider- 
ations than those governing attorneys generally.368 The prosecutor exer- 
cises a "quasi-judicial" function.369 Because the prosecutor exercises 
such awesome power, society requires "assurance that those who would 
356. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 284. 
357. See Yetter, supra note 344. 
358. Profe.~sional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B A. J. 1 159, 121 8 
(1958) (ABA report describes prosecutors obligations as higher than those of lawyers generally); 
FKI ~ D M A N ,  slipra note 316. at 213-15. 
359. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 3-1.1 cmt. (2d ed. 1986) (prosecutor occu- 
pie\ "quasi-judicial position"). 
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wield this power will be guided solely by their sense of public responsi- 
bility for the attainment of justice."360 
Regrettably, this "assurance" is sorely lacking, as many courts 
and commentators have concluded.361 Indeed, the increasing incidence 
of prosecutorial misconduct suggests that it has become "normative to 
the system."362 Sanctions for misconduct are so infrequent as to appear 
almost non-existent. The courts focus on the impact of the misconduct 
upon the verdict, and professional disciplinary bodies appear unable or 
unwilling to grapple with ethical violations by prosecutors. However, 
given the prosecutor's unique role, it may be appropriate to consider 
creating a disciplinary mechanism aimed solely at prosecutors. The 
model for such an institutional body would be the state judicial conduct 
organizations, which exist in every state, and are charged with the re- 
sponsibility of regulating judicial conduct.363 Such organizations have 
become an accepted part of government to assure that judges maintain 
high standards of integrity and responsibility. As a quasi-judicial officer 
functioning under special ethical standards, the prosecutor, like the 
judge, is an appropriate subject for regulation and enforcement of 
discipline. 
In discussing the inadequacy of professional discipline, Professor 
Steele proposed a statute based partly on the Prosecutor Council of 
Texas.364 Professor Steele's proposed statute is similar procedurally to 
the judicial conduct commissions. The statute would authorize a griev- 
ance committee to conduct an investigation, institute formal proceed- 
ings before a hearing examiner, and impose disciplinary sanctions that 
include removal, fines, and admonitions. The Council, however, was 
created not to discipline prosecutors but rather, to deliver technical as- 
sistance and training. 
There would seem to be no constitutional impediment to the crea- 
tian of such a regulatory body. The prosecutor is a member of the exec- 
utive branch of state government. The chief executive of the state ordi- 
narily has the power to remove prosecutors, and appoint special 
360. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987). 
361. See supra notes 319-20. 
362. Steele. supra note 320, at 975. 
363. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Stare Judicial Cond~rcr Organizarions, 76 KY L J 81 1 
(1987). 
364. Steele, supra note 320. See also TEX. REV. CIV STAT AMY art. 332d (West Supp. 
1984). The Council was abolished in 1985. Acts 1985. 69th Leg., ch. 480 $ 26(1), efictive Sept. 
1 .  1985. 
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The creation of a prosecutorial conduct commission 
would be similar to the creation of a state inspector general to investi- 
gate misconduct in state government. This would be a welcomed 
development. 
C. RedeJining the Institutional Role of the Prosecutor 
The system of public prosecutions is rooted in early American 
common law.366 It replaced a system of private prosecution in which 
individuals instituted and carried out their own proceedings. Every 
American jurisdiction today provides for a public prosecutor's office to 
prosecute criminal cases in the name of the state. The concept of the 
professional prosecutor has benefits as well as disabilities. 
The benefits derive from having a trained and impartial profes- 
sional advocate serving the public interest by prosecuting criminal of- 
fenders. The disabilities stem from the prosecutor's dual role: an ag- 
gressive advocate seeking convictions and a quasi-judicial official 
seeking justice. These roles, commentators have suggested, may be in- 
compatible.367 The existence of a zealous desire to win a conviction nec- 
essarily results in willful, or even unconscious, misconduct. As Profes- 
sor Fisher has pointed out,368 such overzealousness might manifest 
itself in prosecuting a case rather than dismissing it; overcharging; in- 
terpreting substantive laws expansively and procedural protections nar- 
rowly; winning as many convictions as possible; or obtaining the sever- 
est penalties. Overzealousness also manifests itself in other ways, such 
as hiding exculpatory evidence, engaging in racially motivated or other 
discriminatory charging practices, presenting inadmissible evidence, 
and engaging in inflammatory trial conduct. Commentators have re- 
peatedly lamented the persistence of misconduct,36e and the inability to 
"solve" the problem.370 
Arguably, the problem of prosecutorial excess inheres in the char- 
365. See, e.g.. N Y CONST, art. IV 3 (imposing on Governor the power to "take care that 
the laws are faithfully executed"); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 63(2). 63(8) (McKinney 1991) (authoriz- 
ing Governor to issue executive orders to appoint special prosecutors). 
366. For a helpful discussion of the history of prosecution in America, see Andrew Sidman, 
Note, The Outnloded Concept of Private Prosecution. 25 Ah1 U .  L. REV. 754, 762-65 (1976). 
367. See Fisher. supra note 74, at 198-202. 
368. Id. at 200. 
369. See supra note 319. 
370. Allen, supra note 74. at 335 ("minimizing prosecutorial excesses is one of this coun- 
try's great unsolved problems in criminal law administration"). 
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acter of the individual prosecutor. Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote the 
following about the "good prosecutor:"371 
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define 
as those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to be told would not 
understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps 
the best protection against the abuse of power, and the citizen's safety lies in the 
prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not vic- 
tims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his task 
with humility. 
Contrast the foregoing statement with the following remark attrib- 
uted to a state prosecutor: "Any prosecutor can convict a guilty man; it 
takes a great prosecutor to convict an innocent man."372 
This statement is not representative of prosecutors. Many prosecu- 
tors I know, and have known, behave with consummate fairness. To 
these prosecutors, doing justice is what makes their public service 
meaningful. However, these anecdotal references, while reassuring, 
should not be taken to suggest that misconduct is aberrant. 
Lord Patrick Devlin, one of the most distinguished English jurists, 
in his Sherrill Lectures at the Yale Law School, discussed the role of 
prosecutors in the English criminal justice system.373 Prosecution in 
Great Britain, Lord Devlin explained, is not in the hands of any special 
body dedicated to that particular class of work, such as our District 
Attorney. The barristers who prosecute the case are not professional 
prosecutors, but professional attorneys. One day they may be prosecut- 
ing a case, the next day they may be defending a case. Thus, "the 
barristers who have to decide what is fair and unfair are not prosecu- 
tion-minded."374 They do not tend to see things from the point of view 
of any one side exclusively, and acquire no special sympathy for either. 
Lord Devlin also pointed out that the prosecuting counsel "is to act as 
a minister of justice rather than as an advocate; he is not to press for a 
conviction but is to lay all the facts, those that tell for the prisoner as 
well as those that tell against him, before the 
371. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L & CRI~IINOLOGY 3. 6 
( 1940). 
372. Transcript, The Thin Blue Line, at 40 (Third Floor Productions, Inc. 1988) (defense 
attorney Melvyn Bruder). 
373. PATRICK DEVLIN. THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION I N  ENGLAND 16-25 (1960). 
374. Id. at 21. 
375. Id. at 23. It should be noted that Great Britain has attempted to professionalize the 
prosecutor by establishing in 1986 the Crown Prosecution Service. See JOSIIUA ROZENBERG. Ttlt
CASt FOR THE CROWN (1987). 
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Whether American prosecutors can be the "ministers of justice" 
described by Lord Devlin, or should "temper zeal with human kind- 
ness," as Justice Jackson recommended, are unanswerable questions in 
a criminal justice model that emphasizes crime control over protecting 
individual rights.376 However, Lord Devlin's emphasis on the need for 
prosecutorial objectivity, and the ability of attorneys to attain this goal 
through transferred roles, raises some provocative questions. Is it possi- 
ble to de-professionalize the American prosecutor? Would such de- 
professionalization reduce the incidence of misconduct? Could de- 
professionalization occur through transferred roles between prosecution 
and defense. The ultimate objective, of course, would be to develop a 
prosecutorial ethos that can reconcile vigorous prosecution with fair 
prosecution. 
As in Great Britain, prosecutorial power in America has fre- 
quently been encumbered by the participation of private prosecutors,377 
the removal of prosecutors for misconduct,378 the disqualification of 
prosecutors for conflicts of and the appointment of special 
prosecutors by the judicial or executive branches.380 Moreover, some 
jurisdictions allow private attorneys to be "loaned" to prosecutors' of- 
fices for special purposes, such as the reduction of heavy dockets.381 
Such programs are laudable for several reasons. They allow private at- 
torneys to engage in public service, they enhance the public interest by 
helping to more expeditiously process criminal cases, and they intro- 
duce into prosecution attorneys who do not have a vested interest in 
winning convictions. 
The concept of involving non-prosecutor attorneys in the prosecu- 
tion process might be extended further. It may not be unreasonable, for 
example, to have members of a prosecutor and a public defender office 
in a particular locale replace each other for time periods of, perhaps, 
one year. This cross-fertilization has several benefits, and some risks. It 
could educate and sensitize both the prosecutor and the defense lawyer 
376. It should be made clear that prosecutors are not a homogeneous group, and urban 
prosecutors confront very different problems than suburban prosecutors. See JEAN A. JACOBY. THE 
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 273-295 (1980). Thus, while generalizations 
and "fearful stereotypes" (id. at 295) do not make analysis clearer, there are broad principles that 
may be usefully discussed, as this article has attempted to do. 
377. See slcpra note 366 and accompanying text. 
378. See supra note 365 and accompanying text. 
379. Young v. United States ex ref. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
380. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
381. Seth v. State. 592 A.2d 436 (Del. 1991). 
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to each other's experiences and problems. It could produce a 
prosecutorial ethos that is increasingly associated with seeking justice, 
rather than an ethos based on winning convictions. Such a program, 
while not tempering legitimate advocacy, could, through mutual under- 
standing and shared experiences, reduce the excesses resulting from ad- 
versarial combat. 
It may be that our adversary system is incapable of accommodat- 
ing such a proposal, and that neither prosecutors nor defense attorneys 
are capable of such cross-fertilization. There are ethical implications 
that need to be addressed, most significantly the ability to accommo- 
date the different ethical standards for defense lawyers and prosecu- 
t o r ~ . ~ ~ ~  That may be the most serious obstacle of all. 
To be sure, better training and supervision play a significant role 
in fostering an atmosphere in which ethical norms are understood and 
practiced.383 However, the present ethos of overzealous prosecutorial 
advocacy may be too ingrained to be appreciably affected by education 
and training. It may be that only by fostering a new ethos through the 
kind of system that Lord Devlin discussed can prosecutors begin to 
demonstrate the qualities that make for a "good prosecutor." 
This article attempted to describe the recent accretion of power by 
prosecutors, the effect it has had on the adversary system, and the fail- 
ure of judicial or disciplinary bodies to restrain prosecutorial excesses. 
Given the well-documented existence of misconduct, the current lais- 
sez-faire attitude of the courts, and the disappointing response of pro- 
fessional grievance committees, there is a potential for even greater 
misuse of "the awful instruments of the criminal The sugges- 
tions in Part I1 are intended to encourage discussion about ways to 
foster a new prosecutorial ethos that balances zeal with fairness and 
results in truly fair criminal trials. 
382. See supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text. 
383. See Fisher, supra note 74, at 254-60. 
384. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.). 
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